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
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IN REPLY REFER TO

AGAM-P (M) (30 Oct 68) FOR OT RD 683289

6 November 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, II Field  
Force Vietnam, Period Ending 31 July 1968 (U)

AD393858

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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure that the Army realizes current benefits from lessons learned during recent operations.
3. To insure that the information provided through the Lessons Learned Program is readily available on a continuous basis, a cumulative Lessons Learned Index containing alphabetical listings of items appearing in the reports is compiled and distributed periodically. Recipients of the attached report are encouraged to recommend items from it for inclusion in the Index by completing and returning the self-addressed form provided at the end of this report.

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*Kenneth G. Wickham*

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AVFDC-RE-H

14 AUG 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam  
for Period Ending 31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR - 65 (R1) (W-DHO-  
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1. (C) Section 1. Operations: Significant Activities.

a. Commands:

(1) During the reporting period there were 14 changes in the staff of II FFORCEV.

(a) On 25 July 1968, Major General John H. Hay Jr., Deputy Commanding General, II FFORCEV since 2 March 1968, departed the command for CONUS.

(b) On 22 June, Brigadier General Donald D. Dunlop became the Deputy Senior Advisor, III Corps, replacing Colonel Gus S. Peters.

(c) On 14 June, Colonel Paul E. Hunt became the Deputy Chief of Staff, replacing Colonel Joseph P. Mitchell.

(d) On 7 July, Colonel Paul E. Hunt became the Acting Chief of Staff, replacing Brigadier General Raymond P. Murphy.

(e) On 26 July, Colonel Darrell G. Wood became the ACoS, G2, replacing Colonel John D. Foulk.

(f) On 1 July, Colonel Leonard Becicka became the Provost Marshal, replacing Colonel Julien H. LePage.

(g) On 24 April, Colonel Joseph J. Gofell became Staff Chaplain, replacing Colonel Earl S. Bloxham.

(h) On 12 July 1968, Colonel James A. Vivian became Staff Engineer, replacing Colonel Joseph A. Jansen.

(i) On 14 June 1968, Colonel Bernard Big became Inspector General, replacing Lieutenant Colonel Harold P. Mueller.

(j) On 17 July 1968, Colonel Wallace Capel became Staff Surgeon, replacing Lieutenant Colonel Richard M. Adams.

(k) On 15 July 1968, Colonel Walter G. Runte became Signal Officer, replacing Colonel John D. Hartline.

(l) On 21 July 1968, Lieutenant Colonel Arthur H. Lindeman became Secretary of the General Staff, replacing Lieutenant Colonel Theodore S. O'Connor.

FOR OT RD  
683289

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(a) On 16 July 1968, Lieutenant Colonel Charles W. Jones Jr. became Headquarters Commandant, replacing Lieutenant Colonel William V. Murcko.

(n) On 15 July 1968, Lieutenant Colonel Jon G. Blissitt became Information Officer, replacing Major Cleve Cunningham.

(2) The overall assigned/attached strength of II FFORCEV increased during the quarter. A comparison at the end of the last four reporting periods follows:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>OFFICER</u>	<u>WARRANT OFFICER</u>	<u>ENLISTED MEN</u>
31 October 1967	323	34	2807
31 January 1968	334	26	2915
30 April 1968	337	27	2983
31 July 1968	339	34	3148

b. Personnel, Health, Morale, Safety and Discipline.

(1) The personnel situation within units assigned, attached and under the operational control (OPCON) of II FFORCEV remains satisfactory.

(2) The health of the command continues to be excellent.

(3) Morale of the troops continues at a high level.

(4) During the reporting period, the awards and decorations division processed, approved and issued awards as follows:

	<u>Feb 68 - Apr 68</u>	<u>May 68 - Jul 68</u>
Silver Star	19	47
Distinguished Flying Cross	4	4
Soldier's Medal	11	24
Bronze Star Medal	149	184
Air Medal	66	58
Army Commendation Medal	162	283

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Feb 68 - Apr 68    May 68 - Jul 68

Purple Heart	<u>29</u>	<u>32</u>
Total	440	632

(5) Development of II FFORCEV base camp continues satisfactorily.  
Status of significant projects as of 31 July 1968 follows:

- (a) EM/NGO Club - basic building complete.
- (b) Officers Club - basic building complete.
- (c) Chapel Annex - 95 percent complete.
- (d) Repair of perimeter defensive positions is continuous.

(6) II FFORCEV Reg 385-1, was updated 9 July 1968, and a II FFORCEV Safety Council was established.

(7) Provost Marshal:

(a) On 16 May 1968 a program was initiated to identify and neutralize possible enemy agent infiltration of the II FFORCEV installation. U. S. Military Police, VN National Policemen and Policewomen with agents from the Military Intelligence Detachment made a thorough check of all local employees entering the installation. National Police checked Vietnamese documentation for authenticity and against a "black-list" of known and suspected enemy sympathizers furnished by the Military Intelligence Detachment.

(b) U. S. Military Police checked U. S. documentation and MI agents interviewed personnel whose documents revealed irregularities. All personnel and vehicles were searched for contraband. Additional military policemen were used to control personnel awaiting processing and to search the waiting area after the operation.

(c) Fourteen employees had names identical to those appearing on the "black-list". Further investigation by VN National Police and Military Intelligence personnel subsequently cleared these individuals as suspects as they had very common names likely to appear on any large list of Vietnamese names. No other irregularities were discovered.

(d) Operations of this nature are essential to ensure maximum security of installations employing indigenous personnel and to reduce even low grade intelligence capabilities of VC agents. Utilization of VN National Police is imperative to protect the rights of local National civilians. The "black-list" provided by Military Intelligence should be up-dated on a regular basis so that a continuing check of Vietnamese documentation can be made by processing personnel.

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(c) Intelligence and Counterintelligence:

(1) Intelligence aspects of tactical operations conducted in the II FFORCEV Tactical Area of Interest (TAOI) are discussed in the Operational Report - Lessons Learned submitted by units under operational control of this headquarters.

(2) Intelligence Collection: Significant in the utilization of intelligence resources by II FFORCEV was the authorization by MACV, on 15 May 1968 to establish a decentralized intelligence collection effort. As a result of this action, II FFORCEV now tasks directly US military intelligence agencies and advisory elements located in the II FFORCEV TAOI. This new procedure has reduced duplication of effort in collection activities and has materially assisted in filling intelligence gaps. The decentralized collection management system makes it possible to integrate all intelligence assets within the III CTZ into a unified collection effort. Recent responses show that under this concept the time for passing raw information from collector to user is greatly reduced.

(a) The utilization of human resources in fulfillment of II FFORCEV intelligence requirements have substantially increased. Human resources have proved reliable in answering high priority requests for intelligence and in furnishing early warning concerning impending enemy attacks. To further manage the resources available to II FFORCEV, Specific Intelligence Requirements (SICR) are now being published to fill gaps in current intelligence holdings. SICR may be requested by any element of this headquarters to fill a void in information. In addition to individual SICR a II FFORCEV Collection Registry was published. The registry lists all intelligence requirements of II FFORCEV and the unit(s) responsible for the necessary collection action.

(b) During the past quarter the attack on the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI) under the PHOENIX Program has continued, however, not at the rate desired or necessary. Probably the major gain was the increase in efficiency of reporting and record processing of VCI eliminated. At present it is believed that almost all the VCI eliminated are being reported. II FFORCEV directed all US elements to support actively the PHOENIX Program and to establish liaison and furnish reports to province PHOENIX coordinators. District Intelligence and Operations Coordinating Centers (DIOCC) have been able to expand their operations once again into the rural areas as the Viet Cong threat to the urban cities has diminished in most of the provinces. At present the main obstacle facing the PHOENIX Program is to gain the full support of GVN in execution of the program. In many areas of III CTZ, if the PHOENIX advisor were withdrawn the program would collapse.

(c) The exploitation of prisoners of war has made even greater improvement during this quarter than during the past. Time for submission of the preliminary interrogation report was again reduced by nearly one third.

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Reflecting this more timely acquisition of information, tactical responses based upon prisoner of war exploitation more than doubled. Coordination and exchange of information between II FFORCEV and III Corps continues to be mutually beneficial.

(d) G2 Air:

1. At the beginning of this reporting period, aerial reconnaissance and surveillance were concentrated in and around the Capital Military District (CMD), and the Long Binh/Bien Hoa complex with emphasis placed upon land and waterway avenues of approach into the CMZ in an increased effort due to the imminence of the enemy Second General Offensive. Simultaneously, SLAR reconnaissance and visual reconnaissance (VR) were continued along the coastal and Cambodian border periphery of the III CTZ with concentrated coverage in the vicinity of the Parrot's Beak and the Fish Hook. When enemy elements failed to attain their objectives in the Saigon area and withdrew to intermediate base camps and areas for resupply and to receive replacement personnel, the aerial reconnaissance and surveillance effort was shifted accordingly to locate the enemy and his positions and detect activity on his LOCs while continuing an intensified program within the CMD to locate rocket launching positions. As the enemy stringently avoided contact, commencing during the middle of the reporting period aerial reconnaissance was extended for coverage of central Long Khanh Province, Tay Ninh Province, and the northern areas of Binh Long and Phuoc Long Provinces with emphasis on the infiltration routes extending from the Fish Hook, the Tri-Border area, the Phuoc Long "Saddle", and the Da Gia Map area. At the end of this period, maximum aerial reconnaissance was targeted upon the III CTZ area north of LTL 13 and QL 14 from Tay Ninh to the west of the II CTZ/III CTZ boundary line in the east. Accomplishment of the above involved the use of all available organic aircraft and the assets provided by the 460th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing (TRW) of the 7th US Air Force. One hundred percent of the preplanned objectives within the III CTZ to be accomplished by the organic 73d Surveillance Airplane Company (SAC) (Mohawk) of II FFORCEV, as designated in the Monthly MACV Aerial Reconnaissance Plans, was attained. The preplanned objectives within the III CTZ increased from approximately 80% at the beginning of the period to 87.5% by the end of the period. The annual southwest monsoon was a deterrent to operations of the 460th TRW. Conditions of extreme cloud cover caused a slight increase of mission cancellations, instances of target coverage with the camera position being different from that requested in order to meet the requesting unit's DMLV (Data No Longer of Value) but not having the particular type of aircraft available at the time, and several instances where the target area could not be photographed at all prior to the DMLV. SLAR Mohawk aircraft of the 73d SAC continued joint interdiction operations, targeted primarily against enemy sampans traffic, with Firefly teams of the 334th Armed Helicopter Company throughout the period. SLAR Mohawk aircraft of the Aerial Surveillance and Target Acquisition (ASTA) Platoon of the 1st Infantry

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Division commenced limited joint operations with Firefly teams within the 1st Infantry Division's TAOB during the latter part of the period. The annual southwest monsoon was also a deterrent to these operations as heavy rains and dense ground fog caused Firefly teams to cancel missions or their being diverted to other areas of operations.

2 In a move to facilitate the handling of requests for tactical air reconnaissance missions and to expedite their accomplishment, II FFORCEV was authorized by the Tactical Air Support Element (TASE), MACV, to commence calling in all mission requests, regardless of priority, in lieu of a previous requirement to forward Priority III and IV requests by electrically transmitted messages. This has proved to be a time and work saving arrangement, and it has provided assurance of TASE receiving all mission requests. Another beneficial arrangement established during the period was II FFORCEV being able to provide TASE with nominations for three daytime photo missions and one Infrared (RED HAZE) mission every 24 hour period. A RED HAZE mission nomination called in prior to 1400 hours would be attempted during the same night by the 460th TRW and daytime photo mission nominations called in during the night prior to the day requested would also be attempted. This has expedited the accomplishment of Priority III and IV missions. Effective 15 June 1968, II FFORCEV and OPCOM units commenced to use a standard Air Reconnaissance Request Log (USARV Form 456). Completed monthly logs, e.g. 15 June - 15 July, are being retained by the units for one month and then forwarded to Headquarters, USARV for the purpose of providing reconnaissance records to serve as a basis for a USARV review of the joint tactical air reconnaissance system which supports USARV units with the objective of pinpointing causes of delay and to shorten the time from request to delivery of hard copy photography.

3 SLAR reconnaissance at the beginning of the period was heavily concentrated around the CHD and in the southwestern area (Long An and Hau Nghia Provinces) of the III CTZ. Adjusting with the tactical situation, this was deployed to obtain additional coverage along the Cambodian border in Viet Cong War Zone "C" and in northern Binh Long and Phuoc Long Provinces, and along the II CTZ/III CTZ boundary line. Coverage in the northern, northeastern, and eastern areas of III CTZ produced noticeably fewer results than reconnaissance conducted in the southwest, in all probability due to the heavy jungle canopy and hilly terrain in the northern and eastern areas. The results of SLAR Mohawk aircraft and Firefly teams in joint interdiction operations during this quarter were 426 sampans destroyed. Some of the sampans were stationary and detected visually as targets of opportunity by the Firefly teams while searching assigned areas, and the others were moving sampans detected by SLAR and relayed inflight as moving target indicators to the Firefly teams. At the beginning of the period, one to two Firefly teams were made available to operate with SLAR Mohawks. During July, the number of available Firefly teams was increased to four per night. During May and June, the majority of enemy sampans were

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destroyed in the southwest area of the III CTZ. With the increase of Firefly teams in July, joint operations were deployed along the Saigon River between Saigon and Dau Tieng, along the Dong Nai River from the Dong Nai River to the Dong Nai Sensitive Area and extending into Long Khanh Province, and between the Parrot's Beak and Tay Ninh City. As a result, many of the sampans were destroyed on and along the Saigon River between Phu Cuong and Dau Tieng during July. Additional sampans were detected and destroyed on waterways in the vicinity of Highway 1 between the Cambodian border and Go Dau Ha in late July.

4. The 73d SAC and the ASTA Platoon of the 1st Infantry Division conducted RED HAZE surveillance of pre-planned objective areas throughout the III CTZ in accordance with the Monthly MACV Aerial Reconnaissance Plans, as well as of target areas for unit immediate requests. RED HAZE surveillance of pre-planned objective areas by the 460th TRW, USAF, was primarily conducted within the peripheral areas of the III CTZ, particularly in Phuoc Long Province in the northeastern CTZ area. Effective 1 July 1968, the number of pre-planned objective areas published in the Monthly MACV Aerial Reconnaissance Plan to be flown by the 73d SAC increased from 33 to 60. This resulted from II FFORCEV urging OPGON units and III Corps during June to recommend many additional pre-planned areas in order to provide more RED HAZE surveillance within the III CTZ. This increase was met by 100% accomplishment at no sacrifice to the accomplishment of unit immediate requests. A special evaluation of RED HAZE surveillance was conducted during the period 19 - 23 July. Concentrated surveillance was conducted in the same selected areas in Binh Long Province in the vicinity of Loc Ninh in response to reports of heavy enemy infiltration in that area. The locations of heat returns acquired by the RED HAZE sensor were compared with daily reports of artillery H&I fire and discrimination against known populated areas, friendly, Viet Cong controlled, or contested, to determine the significance and validity of the detected heat emissions. Although the number of returns acquired during the five nights of surveillance was relatively light and not concentrated except in Loc Ninh City, the majority of the returns after discrimination were considered significant and valid.

5. Visual reconnaissance (VR) conducted during the period by organic and USAF aircraft covered an average of 50 VR areas of 61 established VR areas within the III CTZ daily. At the beginning of the quarter, 38 O-1 aircraft of II FFORCEV (12th Combat Aviation Group) were being allocated to OPGON F4UAF units and III Corps on a daily basis. By the end of the quarter, increased requirements for VR aircraft caused the increase of allocations to 40 per day in spite of the loss of three O-1 aircraft, one by enemy ground fire and two by attrition. The number of 73 SAC Mohawks flown for daily VR missions was decreased. Each sortie is flown by a single aircraft rather than by a flight of two aircraft. It was felt that the amount of additional intelligence information gained by the wingman was insufficient to justify two aircraft for each VR sortie. The aircraft

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gained by this change was used as a standby for immediate photo requests. When required and available assets permitted, two aircraft were employed for VR but were assigned separate missions instead of flying as a team. The 73d SAC continued daily VR of the coastline and Cambodian border of the III CTZ and direct support VR missions to O'CON units of II FFORCEV.

6 Mohawk aircraft assets of the 73d SAC and the ASTA Platoon of the 1st Infantry Division were changed during the period. Assets at the end of the period were as follows. The 73d SAC: OV-1A (Visual/Photo) - none, OV-1B (SLAR) - four, and OV-1C (RED HAZE/Photo) - eight. Of the eight OV-1C models, three are stripped of all infrared sensor equipment and equipped with dual controls for training and standardization flights. The change of assets did not affect the capability of this unit to perform its assigned mission. ASTA Platoon, 1st Infantry Division: OV-1B - two, OV-1C - three.

7 There was a significant increase in the amount of aerial photography taken by the 73d SAC on VR missions to confirm sightings and for detailed photo-interpretation of the area in proximity. In addition, this unit was given the mission to take Bomb Damage Assessment (BDA) photographs immediately after selected B-52 strikes. This required close coordination with USAF FAC and ground controllers to enter the area immediately after the last bomb and prior to follow-up tactical airstrikes or artillery. Whenever possible, BDA photo missions were scheduled between mid-morning and mid-afternoon to utilize good light. Detailed photo-interpretation of the mission results was conducted to complement visual BDA reports made by the FAC. A highlight during the period was a special aerial photo mission assigned to the 73d SAC. Shortly after the beginning of the enemy Second General Offensive, COMUSMACV directed that 39 critical facilities in Saigon be photographed to provide in the briefest time possible, extra enlarged panoramic and vertical prints of these facilities and surrounding areas to ground commanders involved in fighting within the Saigon city limits. This mission was successfully accomplished through joint efforts of the 73d SAC and the photo-reproduction facilities of the 460th TRW. As a subsequent mission requirement, enlarged panoramic and vertical photography of critical facilities and areas within the Long Binh/Bien Hoa complex was produced by the 73d SAC for use by the II FFORCEV Commander and his staff as an aid for detailed defense plans.

(3) G-2 Targets continues to develop targets for B-52s, combat air spots, artillery (HEI observed), herbicide operations and persistent CS drops.

(a) Visual reconnaissance, prisoners of war, Hoi Chanhs, Long Range Patrols, troop contacts, captured documents, and agent reports continue to be fed into an updated data base. This data base is used in conjunction with results from all available technical sensors including RED HAZE,

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SIAR, and personnel detectors (sniffers). Intelligence reports of enemy ground activity, fire on friendly aircraft and enemy caches provide information for selected target areas.

(b) Knowledge of enemy tactics such as border movement, basing near streams and avoiding artillery fire combined with terrain analysis further aids the analyst in his recommendation of the proper tactical response for the respective target areas.

(c) II FFORCEV OFCON units continue to develop the majority of targets in their respective areas of operations.

(d) The large increase in B-52 ordnance assets in II. CTZ during this quarter as compared to all previous reporting periods has resulted in greater command emphasis on targeting to include greater coordination of all intelligence information between II FFORCEV and OFCON units.

## (4) Description and Recapitulation of Enemy Order of Battle.

(a) Description: The Central Office of South Vietnam (COSVN) remains the supreme military and political headquarters for Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army units in the Republic of Vietnam. While the enemy boundaries and designation of areas within III Corps Tactical Zone remained unchanged, additional information has been received on the "sub-region" organization. As provided by Colonel Le Van Ngot also known as (AKA) Ba Sinh, Commanding Officer of Sub-Region 5 and Deputy Commanding Officer of Sub-Region Front, captured on 10 June 1968, COSVN established the six sub-regions in August 1967 as unified military and political command structures from Military Regions I and IV, as part of its planning for the TET Offensive. The Viet Cong Province level organizations in the sub-region areas were abolished at that time. Following an analysis of the failure of the TET Offensive against Saigon, COSVN modified the sub-region concept in March 1968 by organizing in each sub-region separate military and political/economic command structures, both of which remained subordinate to the appropriate committees of COSVN. The six sub-regions became the six political/economic command structures and the five fronts (Sub-Region 6, the Saigon-Cholon area, does not have a front because it is strictly a political region) became the military command structure. Each command is separate and independent, reporting to COSVN through its own channels. However, the Front Commander and the Sub-Region Commander, through coordination, provide each other with assistance in performance of assigned tasks. In conjunction with this, the enemy continues in his attempts to increase the military strength of the sub-regions by forming new regimental size units and by introducing new North Vietnamese battalions into the sub-region structure. However, it does not appear that the enemy has completed these efforts.

## (b) Significant Order of Battle Developments.

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1. The status of enemy forces continued to undergo considerable change during this quarter. Although the enemy has increased the total number of maneuver battalions, he has only, at the latter part of the quarter, regained the overall pre-TET strength in his combat forces. The impact of this increase in the number of maneuver battalions without any accompanying increase in the overall strength of his combat forces, is that he has been unable to increase effectively his overall military capabilities. The table below portrays the combat effectiveness of regiments and separate battalions at the beginning and at the end of the quarter. Units possibly present, but not yet firmly recorded, are shown in parentheses. The table includes units in IV Corps Tactical Zone, located in areas in which the 9th US Infantry Division conducts operations.

	FCE	CE	1 May MCE	NCE	TOTALS	FCE	31 July CE	MCE	NCE
Inf Regt		1	4	6	11 12(3)		(1)	7(2)	5
Inf Bn	1	5(1)	17(2)	3	26(3) 29(5)	2	4(1)	17(1)	6(3)
Arty Cnd		1			1 1		1		
Arty Regt		1(1-)			1(1-) 2(1)		2(1)		
Arty Bn		1(1)	(1)		1(2) 1(2)		(2)	1	
Sapper Bn		1(1)		1	2(1) 2(2)			1(2)	1
Recon Bn		1			1 1		1		

NOTE: Two of the three possible Infantry Regiments appear to have been formed from existing battalions. If confirmed, the total number of infantry battalions would be reduced to 24(4). The one possible artillery regiment has likewise been formed from existing assets. If confirmed, total number of artillery battalions would be reduced to one.

2. Indications are that the 274th and 275th Viet Cong Regiments are currently operating independent of the 5th Viet Cong Division Headquarters under COSVN control. An agent who has reported reliable information in the past reported that the 5th Viet Cong Division Headquarters has relocated from War Zone "D" to War Zone "C" where it received a new regiment recently infiltrated from North Vietnam. This information has not been confirmed by other intelligence.

3. Sufficient information was received during the quarter to confirm the formation of the 1st Viet Cong (AKA Thu Duc) Regiment in III Corps

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Tactical Zone. The regiment was activated on 26 April 1968 in Sub-Region 4 from known enemy units. The regiment was formed with two infantry battalions, the former 4th Viet Cong LF Battalion and the former 2d Battalion/274th Viet Cong Regiment, with regimental support elements being provided by the 5th Viet Cong Division and Sub-Region 4. The current strength of this regiment is estimated to be 760 men (NCE).

4. A new regiment was identified in contact with elements of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment on 18 July four kilometers northeast of Loc Ninh. Documents taken in the action identified the enemy force as an element of the 32d NVA Regiment, which was previously subordinate to the N-3 Front in II Corps Tactical Zone. The exact arrival date of the regiment into the III Corps Tactical Zone is not known, but preliminary analysis has tentatively established the date as being in late May or early June time frame. The 3d Battalion of the regiment remained in western Pleiku Province. However, it is believed that the regiment received a replacement battalion prior to its southward relocation. In conjunction with the captured documents, a 25 July rallier has provided additional information indicating that the 32d NVA Regiment has, or will become subordinate to the 7th NVA Division.

5. On 5 May, following an attack on Bu Dop, Detachment A-341, 5th Special Forces Group captured three enemy soldiers from the 211th MF Battalion of Military Region 10. Interrogation of these prisoners revealed the possible formation of a new regiment. The regiment was reportedly organized in April 1968 by grouping together locally available assets: the 211th and 212th MF Battalions, which have been confirmed, a previously independent 75mm Recoilless Rifle Company, and a previously independent 82mm mortar company.

6. On 8 July, a prisoner of war who had been captured in the 6th Precinct of Saigon, stated that he was the platoon leader of a security platoon assigned to the headquarters of the 1st Viet Cong (AKA 679th, Chu Long 2) Regiment of Sub-Region 2. The prisoner of war revealed that the regiment was formed by grouping together the 267th Viet Cong MF Battalion, the 269th Viet Cong MF Battalion and the 6th Viet Cong LF Battalion, which composed the deactivated Dong Thap II Regiment. Furthermore, a variety of prisoners captured during the May attacks on Saigon revealed the presence of a new battalion in Sub-Region 2, also reportedly subordinate to the regiment. Although much of the information is contradictory, it appears that the 308th Battalion relocated from Viet Cong Tra Vinh Province in Military Region 3, and was reinforced with North Vietnamese fillers. Like the 1st Viet Cong Regiment of Sub-Region 4 and the "Song Be" Regiment of Military Region 10, this regiment was also activated sometime in April 1968.

7. Reports continue to be received indicating the formation of regimental entities in Sub-Region 1 and 3; however, sufficient intelligence

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has not been received to warrant their acceptance into the "possible" category. In Sub-Region 1, the "Cu Chi" and 273C Viet Cong Regiments have been reportedly formed from locally available assets and North Vietnamese infiltration groups. The "Cu Chi" Regiment is reportedly comprised of the 7th Viet Cong LF Battalion, the 170th Viet Cong MF Battalion (see para 9) and the K2 Battalion (see para 16) while the 273C Regiment was formed by grouping together the 1st Viet Cong MF Battalion, the 2d Viet Cong LF Battalion, and the Gia Dinh & Sapper Battalion (see para 17). In Sub-Region 3, while reports have been received of the formation of a regimental grouping of the sub-region battalions, specific battalions have yet to be associated with this formation.

8 A number of prisoners of war, captured between 25 May and 2 June, revealed that the Dong Nai Viet Cong Regiment assimilated the 3d Viet Cong LF Battalion in late April 1968. The new organization of the regiment is: K1 Battalion, formerly the D800 LF Battalion-K2 Battalion, formerly infiltration group 309B-K3 Battalion, formerly the 3d Viet Cong LF Battalion and the K4 Battalion, formerly the Phu Loi 1 LF Battalion.

2 Documents captured on 5 May in Cu Chi District of Sub-Region 1 indicate that some time after TET, the 1st Battalion/70th Guard Regiment was resubordinated from COSVN to Sub-Region 1, changing its mission from a COSVN Rear Security element to that of an infantry maneuver battalion. Furthermore, the documents revealed that the battalion's designation had been changed to the 170th Battalion. On 23 May, a soldier of the 2d Battalion/70th Guard Regiment rallied to the Long Khanh Information Service and provided the following information: The 2d Battalion was formerly located in War Zone "C", where it had the mission of guarding the COSVN Rear Base. In mid-April 1968, the battalion received orders to operate across Long Khanh Province. On 8 May, the battalion arrived at the Dong Nai River in Long Khanh Province (YT255278). Before rallying, source heard his company commander reveal that the battalion would coordinate with local forces to attack the Long Khanh Province capital, indicating that the 2d, like the 1st, had received a change of mission. Based on the above, the 170th Battalion has been confirmed as an infantry battalion, while the 2d Battalion has been placed in the possible category.

10 On 27 May, the 18th ARVN Division captured two enemy soldiers who stated that they were members of the 338th Battalion of the 320B Division in North Vietnam, which began infiltration in November 1967 as Infiltration Group 241. Upon arrival the entire battalion was assigned to Q4 (AKA 274th Viet Cong) Regiment to replace the 2d Battalion, which became a part of the 1st Viet Cong Regiment of Sub-Region 4.

11 The 267B Battalion was accepted into II FFORCEV Order of Battle holdings as a confirmed unit on 11 May as a result of prisoners of war statements and documents captured at Bao Trai on 6 May 68 and at Tra Cu

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on 21 April 1968. The unit is composed of three infantry companies and a support company and was formed from the C.2 Company of Duc Hoa and C.120 Company of Duc Hue, as well as locally recruited personnel. The unit was formed following the TET Offensive.

12 On 1 July 1968, vic XS693533, elements of the 9th US Infantry Division captured a member of the 265th Viet Cong MF Infantry Battalion. The prisoner of war stated that the battalion consisted of three infantry companies and one support company. The three infantry companies are each composed of three platoons. The support company is composed of one reconnaissance, one communications, and one support platoon. A document taken from Phan Thong, the political officer of the 2d Independent Battalion who was captured on 8 July, listed the agencies and units of Sub-Region 3. The 265th Battalion was listed as subordinate to the Sub-Region.

13 Documents and prisoners captured between 22 and 24 June 68 identified the 294th NVA MF Infantry Battalion. The battalion was formed in 1967 and departed NVN with a strength of 600 men in January 1968, after being designated the 386th Infiltration Group. The battalion arrived in Long An Province in June 1968 at which time the designation was changed to the 294th Battalion. A Viet Cong Top Secret document was captured by 9th Infantry Division elements in Long An Province on 8 July which listed the subordinate units of Sub-Region 3. The 294th Battalion was included in the list of subordinate units.

14 Agent reports and prisoners of war have continually reported the existence of the 514B Viet Cong LF Battalion in Military Region 2 since late January 1968. A prisoner of war, Nguyen Van Dan, Executive Officer of the 1st Company of the 514B Viet Cong LF Battalion was captured on 10 May. Interrogation of Dan confirmed the existence of the 514B Viet Cong LF Battalion. According to Dan the battalion was formed on 23 January 1968. One company size force from the 514th Viet Cong LF Battalion became the 1st Company and 90 individuals, recruited by village cadre in Viet Cong Go Cong Province, became the 2d Company. The 514th Battalion remained subordinate to My Tho Province and the 514B Battalion subordinate to Viet Cong Go Cong Province. The mission of the 514th Battalion, according to Dan, is to harass ARVN outposts in Go Cong Province. The battalion is composed of two infantry companies and one support company.

15 The 1st US Infantry Division captured a number of documents and prisoners of war during contacts on 4 and 5 May north of Di An which revealed the formation of the 21st Independent Battalion stated that the unit was composed of three companies. The first company was composed of the C.100 Reconnaissance Company of the 5th Viet Cong Division, a 30-man mortar crew from the 22d Artillery Battalion, and four flamethrower crews from the 5th Division. The 3d Company was reported to be a 70-man signal company recruited from the 274th and 275th Regiments and the 3d LF Infantry Battalion of Di An District. The contacts on 4 and 5 May are believed to have rendered the Battalion combat ineffective.

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16 On 3 June 1968, Le Van Pha, a rallier, identified his unit as the K.2 Battalion of the "Cu Chi" Regiment. Le stated that his battalion was formed from personnel of the 263d and 342d Infiltration Groups. The strength of the K.2 Battalion according to Le, is 280 men.

17 A number of documents captured by elements of the 1st US Infantry Division on 25 March 1968, vic XT638385, provided information on the organization of the Gia Dinh 4 Sapper Battalion which was first reported by prisoners during early June. One of the documents, dated 14 December 1967, was a TO&E and revealed that the battalion was composed of a battalion headquarters consisting of 28 men, two sapper companies of 66 men each, and two "armored companies" of 46 men each. According to Major Huynh Thanh Dong, Chief of Staff of the Advance Command Post of Sub-Region 1, who was captured on 19 June, the 4th Sapper Battalion was subordinate to the 273d Regiment and had one company with the 1st and 2d Battalions of the regiment while the remaining companies were located in the Rear Base Area.

18 The probable organization of the enemy artillery units now known to be operating in III Corps Tactical Zone consists of the 69th Artillery Command with three subordinate regiments and two separate subordinate battalions. These units are the 96th Artillery Regiment, the 84A Artillery Regiment, the 208th Artillery Regiment, each composed of three rocket capable battalions, and the 56th AA Battalion and 58th Artillery Battalion. The 84A Regiment and 96th Regiment each have a 122mm and 107mm rocket capability.

19 On 4 May, D/4/12 Infantry, of the 199th Infantry Brigade (Separate) (Light) captured a number of documents in a hospital complex. Among the documents was a financial account settlement report, dated 28 April 1968 and signed by Hoang Sam, Adjutant of the Supply Section, C22/D67/CT5, possibly the 69th Engineer Battalion. The existence of the 67th Engineer Battalion was first revealed in documents captured on 28 April 1968 by the 199th Infantry Brigade (Separate) (Light).

20 Documents captured since TET have revealed the identity of the new Secretary of COSVN as Bay Hong. Bay Hong replaces General Nguyen Chi Thanh who was killed in a B-52 strike in War Zone "C" during the Fall of 1967.

## (c) Recapitulation:

1 The Viet Cong regions, provinces and special zones in III Corps Tactical Zone only, controlled 66 local force companies and 17 platoons.

2 The battalion and regimental sized units located within III Corps Tactical Zone were as follows:

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<u>Unit</u>	<u>Subordination</u>
69th Artillery Command	COSVN
84A NVA Artillery Regt	69th Arty Command
208th NVA Arty Regt	69th Arty Command
88th NVA Regt	COSVN
274th VC Regt	5th VC Division
275th VC Regt	5th VC Division
141st NVA Regt	7th NVA Division
165th NVA Regt	7th NVA Division
271st VC Regt	9th VC Division
272d VC Regt	9th VC Division
273d VC Regt	9th VC Division
101st NVA Regt	Sub-Region 1
2d VC LF Bn	Sub-Region 1
7th VC LF Bn	Sub-Region 1
1st VC MF Bn	Sub-Region 1
8th VC Arty Bn	Sub-Region 1
170th Bn	Sub-Region 1
6th VC LF Bn	Sub-Region 2
16th VC LF Bn	Sub-Region 2
267th VC MF Bn	Sub-Region 2
267B VC LF Bn	Sub-Region 2
269th VC MF Bn	Sub-Region 2
2d Ind VC LF Bn	Sub-Region 3

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K.3 NVA MF Bn	Sub-Region 3
5th VC LF Bn	Sub-Region 3
265th Bn	Sub-Region 3
Phu Loi II MF Bn	Sub-Region 3
294th Bn	Sub-Region 3
506th VC LF Bn	Sub-Region 3
1st VC Regt	Sub-Region 4
Group 10 BSSZ	Sub-Region 4
Dong Nai VC Regt	Sub-Region 5
C.10 Sapper Bn	Sub-Region 6
14th VC MF Bn	Tay Ninh Province
D440 VC LF Bn	Ba Bien Province
D445 VC MF Bn	Ba Bien Province
211th MF Bn	Military Region 10
212th MF Bn	Military Region 10
46th Recon Bn	GO SVN
2d VC Guard Bn	Unk

3. The following units are located in northern IV Corps Tactical  
Zone in the II FFOCEV Tactical Area, of Interest.

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Subordination</u>
Dong Thap I VC Regt	Military Region 2
295th VC MF Bn	Military Region 2
518th VC LF Bn	Military Region 2
502d VC LF Bn	Kien Phuoc Province

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504th VC LF Bn	Kien Phuong Province
512th VC LF Bn	An Giang Province
514th VC LF Bn	My Tho Province
516th VC LF Bn	Ben Tre Province

4. Units possibly present in III Corps Tactical Zone are listed below.

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Subordination</u>
96th NVA Arty Regt	69th Arty Command
K.33 Arty Bn	Possibly 96th Arty Regt
K.34 Arty Bn	Possibly 96th Arty Regt
"Song Be" VC Regt	Possibly Military Region 10
679th VC Regt	Sub-Region 2
32d NVA Regt	Possibly 7th NVA Div
12th Bn	Unk
21st Ind Bn	Possibly 5th Division
(New) 2d Bn	274th VC Regt
308th Bn	Sub-Region 2
K.2 Bn	Possibly Sub-Region 1
4th NVA Sapper Bn	Unk
67th Engineer Bn	Unk
Gia Dinh 4 Sapper Bn	Poss Sub-Region 1

(d) Summary of Recent Activities:

1. The two major occurrences during the reporting period were the initiation and defeat of the enemy's second general offensive during May and the major relocation of enemy units during July. The enemy launched his offensive on 4 May with the principal and almost only target being Saigon. This contrasted with the TET Offensive when the enemy conducted attacks throughout central and southern III Corps Tactical Zone. It was

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evident from captured documents and prisoners that the enemy had made many efforts to improve his command and control structure to the extent of upgrading local force units into main force units and placing them under control of newly created regimental headquarters. The defeat of the enemy's offensive saw him enter a standdown period while withdrawing from the Capital Military District. The end of July saw the majority of the enemy's strongest units positioned in northern and northwestern III Corps Tactical Zone. Simultaneously with this withdrawal, the enemy continued his infiltration of troops into the Corps Tactical Zone, utilizing the technique of shifting trained, combat effective units from other Corps Zones in addition to infiltrating individual replacements.

2 5th Viet Cong Division: This division did not take part in the Second General Offensive. The 274th VC Regiment continued to operate in the area northeast of Xuan Loc, generally tending to avoid contact until 22 June, when the 1st and 3d Battalions were identified as being responsible for an ambush on ARVN elements in the vicinity of YT520345. Since that time the regiment again has avoided contact. The 275th Viet Cong Regiment, apparently no longer under the control of the 5th VC Division, moved from its base area in southern War Zone D to a new operational area between Trang Bang and the Boi Loi Woods, where it had the apparent mission of keeping open lines of communication emanating from the Ba Thu area.

3 The 7th North Vietnamese Army Division: During the reporting period the 7th NVA Division generally operated in its base area northeast of Binh My. Only the 165th NVA Regiment was detected as having participated in the 5 May offensive. The 141st NVA Regiment made several attacks against the 1st Australian Task Force in the area in an attempt to protect the Binh My base area. At the end of July the 7th NVA Division withdrew north to the Tri-Border Base Area (Base Area 350) where it probably assumed control of the newly infiltrated 32d NVA Regiment which arrived from II Corps Tactical Zone earlier in the month.

4 The 9th VC Division: This division was the main assault element of the 5 May offensive. It attacked Saigon in the vicinity of Phu Tho Hoa and the 6th Precinct, but was unable to effect a penetration of the City. By 25 May allied pressure had forced the division to withdraw to base areas. The 271st VC Regiment avoided contact during the rest of the reporting period. The 272d VC Regiment avoided contact during the rest of the reporting period. The 272d VC Regiment was again contacted on 16 June two kilometers southwest of Hoc Mon, and the 273d VC Regiment was identified on 25-26 June six kilometers east of Ben Luc. Since then the 9th VC Division has withdrawn to an area west of Tay Ninh City, except the 271st VC Regiment which is tentatively located southeast of Tay Ninh City.

5 The 101st NVA Regiment also participated in the 5 May offensive, but was never able to get any farther south than Hoc Mon where it was identified on 26 May, eight kilometers east of that city. The 101st NVA Regiment then withdrew to the southern edge of the Trapsoid where it has remained, avoiding contact.

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6 The 88th NVA Regiment penetrated as far as Hoc Mon during the 5 May offensive, but generally operated in the vicinity of Phu Hoa Dong. The 88th NVA Regiment then temporarily withdrew to an area north of the Iron Triangle and later moved to a location north of the Michelin Plantation where it has since remained.

7 The Dong Nai Regiment began and ended the reporting period in its traditional base camp northeast of Binh My. During the 5 May offensive this regiment did make some penetrations of Go Vap and Gia Dinh but sustained severe casualties. The regiment attempted to maintain a foothold in the Capital Military District until the end of June when it withdrew to its current location.

8 In the five sub-regions around Saigon, the enemy created several new regimental entities by combining local and main force battalions. In Sub-Region 1, the 273C Regiment (of four battalions) and the Cu Chi Regiment (of two battalions) made their appearance. The 273C Regiment was virtually destroyed as a military unit during the 5 May offensive. In Sub-Region 2, the Cuu Long 2 Regiment (AKA 679th Regiment) (of four battalions) was formed and had two battalions almost destroyed. In Sub-Region 3, the 90th Regiment (of three battalions) also sustained heavy casualties. Sub-Region 4 Regiment, the Thu Duc (of two battalions), is the only one of these regiments currently accepted in Order of Battle holdings. The Song Be Regiment in MR 10 was not very active during the 5 May offensive.

9 In summary, this quarter began with the enemy launching a full scale attack on the city of Saigon. Within 10 days the force of the offensive had been expended and the contacts became more sporadic and less intense. During the last week of May the enemy launched Phase II of the Second General Offensive, but with considerably less force than earlier. The remainder of the quarter was characterized by periodic harassing attacks, primarily by fire, regrouping, resupply and replenishing personnel losses. At the end of the quarter, though intelligence indicated the development of another major offensive, the enemy had failed to alter his recent relatively inactive role. However, the enemy's current deployment in the northern provinces indicates a major threat in that area, although the enemy may only have withdrawn to those locations to rebuild his forces prior to another attack on Saigon.

## (5) Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Battle Losses:

	<u>KIA</u>	<u>FW</u>	<u>BALLIST</u>	<u>SMALL ARMS</u>	<u>C/S WEAPONS</u>	<u>RICE (TONS)</u>
MAY	11,215	850	221	2,740	822	160.9
JUNE	4,767	872	278	1,654	301	135.2
JULY	2,294	325	284	910	266	3,895.5
TOTAL	18,276	2,047	783	5,304	1,389	4,191.6

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(6) Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army Tactics:

(a) The enemy did not alter his basic tactics during the reporting period, however it became more apparent that he was conducting a more conventional war and gradually changing his tactical posture from that of a political war with military overtones.

(b) During the end of May and the beginning of June the enemy attempted a rocket bombardment of Saigon without ground followup. At one point he propagandized that he would bombard the city of Saigon with "100 rockets per day for 100 days".

(c) Captured documents and prisoners indicate that in the future the enemy will emphasize Sapper and "Special Action" units to effect penetration and sabotage.

(7) Enemy Capabilities, Vulnerabilities and Relative Probability of Adoption at the end of the Quarter:

(a) Capabilities:

1 Attack:

a The enemy is capable of conducting another offensive, aimed principally at Saigon/Tan Son Nhut and Long Binh/Bien Hoa with elements of the 7th North Vietnamese Army Division and the 5th and 9th Viet Cong Divisions, the Dong Nai Regiment and other regimental entities.

b The enemy is capable of attacking in Tay Ninh and Binh Long Provinces with elements of the 7th NVA and 9th VC Divisions.

c The 84A North Vietnamese Army Artillery Regiment, the 208th North Vietnamese Army Artillery Regiment and the possible 96th North Vietnamese Army Artillery can attack lucrative targets throughout III Corps Tactical Zone independently or in support of ground attacks.

d The enemy is capable of conducting limited attacks against allied units, lines of communications, outposts and installations within their respective areas.

2 Defend:

a The enemy is capable of defending base areas in War Zone "C", Binh Long and Phuoc Long Provinces with elements of the 7th North Vietnamese Division and 9th Viet Cong Divisions.

b The enemy is capable of defending base areas in War Zone "D" and Ba Bien Province with elements of the 5th Viet Cong Division and the Dong Nai Regiment.

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3 Reinforce:

a The enemy is capable of immediately reinforcing an attack on Saigon or vicinity with one and possibly two more new regiments from the northern provinces of IV Corps Tactical Zone.

b The enemy is capable of reinforcing with invasion groups of unknown size which are now indicated to be moving into the III Corps Tactical Zone from Cambodia and II Corps Tactical Zone.

4 Withdraw: The enemy is capable of breaking contact and withdrawing to relatively more secure areas at a time of his choosing.

5 Other:

a The enemy is capable of replacing his heavy personnel losses, suffered during the last two offensives, by upgrading guerrillas and by receiving replacements from North Vietnam.

b The enemy is capable of conducting resupply at the required rate.

(b) Vulnerabilities and Weaknesses:

1 The enemy's severe losses suffered during the quarter have caused a serious gap in personnel familiar with the terrain.

2 By sometimes hasty firing on aircraft, the enemy has become increasingly vulnerable to air cavalry, artillery, and tactical airstrikes.

3 The enemy's extended lines of communications are subject to interdiction.

4 The enemy's military operations are vulnerable because of poor timing caused by political pressure.

5 The enemy is susceptible to his own propaganda as in expecting a popular uprising during the TEF Offensive.

6 The enemy is weak in medical facilities and supplies.

7 Upgrading of guerrillas has made vulnerable the enemy's influence and control in the countryside.

8 Deteriorated leadership, due to battle casualties, has caused tactical errors to be made, and may do so again.

9 The enemy is vulnerable to superior allied mobility and firepower, especially in the provinces surrounding the Capital Military District.

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(c) Relative Probability of Adoption at the end of the Quarter:

1 A third offensive, similar to the last two offensives utilizing most main force units in the Saigon attack is probable early in the ensuing quarter.

2 An attack in the northern provinces by the 7th NVA Division and 9th VC Division is probable early in the ensuing quarter.

3 If allied operations continue to interrupt the enemy's plans for a third offensive at an early date, it is probable that the enemy will maintain major elements of his forces in more secure areas in order to receive replacements and to retrain. Continued harassing attacks, particularly by fire, are probable if such a posture is maintained.

d. Operations, Plans and Training.

(1) Operations in the III Corps Tactical Zone.

(a) General. At the beginning of the reporting period, US and Free World Military Assistance Forces (FWMF) under the operational control of Commanding General, II FFORCEV were deployed and conducting operations to interdict and destroy enemy forces preparing to launch a third-phase offensive against Saigon. On 24 April, in response to intelligence reports indicating imminent attack, the Commanding General, II FFORCEV commenced deployment of US/FWMF forces along infiltration and invasion routes into the Capital Military District (CMD) and the city of Saigon. The attacks on Saigon began on 5 May, but so aggressive were friendly forces in interdicting and destroying the invading forces, that few units actually reached the outskirts of the city. Those that penetrated were fragmented, disorganized, and incapable of carrying out the enemy's objective of capturing and holding key areas in the city for five days. Of the 45 identified Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army maneuver battalions in the III Corps Tactical Zone, 31 had been committed to the attack on Saigon. But despite suicidal efforts on the part of the enemy only a maximum of five battalion equivalents, remnants of 13 battalions, actually entered the city. By 7 May, it was clear that the enemy had been defeated. Enemy elements in scattered groups still infiltrated into the city and had to be routed out, but by 13 May, the enemy had begun massive exfiltration of the area around Saigon, and friendly effort was devoted primarily to cutting off his escape. In the last few days of May the enemy attempted a weak attack on Saigon, presumably to establish a presence there, but by the end of May, this attack had been thwarted and the enemy routed. Intelligence reports continued to indicate that the enemy planned large-scale attacks on Saigon. For this reason, sizeable forces were maintained around the city until mid-July, when it became apparent that the enemy had been forced to postpone, perhaps indefinitely, another major offensive. Throughout the remainder of this period, through

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31 July, the enemy largely remained in base areas, under constant attack by friendly forces, airstrikes and bombing raids. His activities were limited to re-equipping and replacing personnel losses and to harassing attacks on friendly installations and lines of communication. During the period of this report, the Royal Thai Army Volunteer Regiment, under the operational control of the 9th Infantry Division, conducted area and route security operations in the vicinity of Bearcat. Two battalions and the advance party, Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force (RTAVF) arrived in Vietnam and commenced in-country training at Bearcat. The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment was under the operational control of other headquarters for most of the period; its operations are discussed with those of the organizations exercising operational control.

(b) 1 - 4 May.

1 During the first few days of May, the enemy conducted diversionary harassing attacks while moving forces estimated at 31 battalions toward Saigon and Gia Vinh Province from the north and west. II FFORCEV units were operating along infiltration routes to intercept and destroy the enemy forces before they reached the critical Saigon area. The 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division was located in Long An Province to interdict movement into the CHD from the south. Elements of the 199th Infantry Brigade (Separate) (Light) conducted operations north of the Dong Nai River some 20 kilometers northeast of Bien Hoa to cut off invasion routes from War Zone "D". Elements of the 25th Infantry Division, supported by Air Cavalry, operated along the Vam Co Dong River and west of Saigon. The 1st Australian Task Force conducted operations east and southeast of Bearcat to block enemy movement into the Long Binh/Bien Hoa area along the northeastern route into Saigon. One squadron of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment was positioned to secure the US military complex at Long Binh/Bien Hoa. The 1st Infantry Division blocked the northern accesses to Saigon, and Company A, 5th Special Forces conducted reconnaissance and interdiction operations in the Thien Quang, Pineapple Plantation area 15 kilometers west of Saigon. Within the Capital Military District, US, Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces and National Police units conducted operations to protect the city. Meanwhile, defenses of critical installations throughout the II FFORCEV area of operations were reinforced. Increased aerial and ground surveillance of the rocket belt around Long Binh/Bien Hoa, Saigon and the area surrounding it, and of the invasion routes leading into this region were among the additional measures employed to detect and destroy enemy forces before they could be massed to attack Saigon.

2 On 3 May, the 3/17 Air Cavalry Squadron, operating with the 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, conducted armed reconnaissance operations along the Vam Co Dong River and in the Iron Triangle, Ho Do and Boi Loi Woods. At 0900 hours, three kilometers southeast of the Filhol Plantation, helicopters of Troop B engaged an estimated 200 enemy. Artillery, mortars and airstrikes supported the contact, which resulted in 31 enemy killed.

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A significantly larger contact occurred the following day, when the 1/18 Infantry, of the 2d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, conducted reconnaissance in force operations in the vicinity of Di An. At 0945 hours, approximately six kilometers northwest of the city, D/1/18 Infantry received small arms, automatic weapons, M-79, and RPG fire. The company returned the fire with organic weapons and airstrikes; artillery and light fire teams supported the contact. Companies A and B, 1/18 Infantry and Troop A and B, 1/4 Cavalry, and Troop A/7/1 Air Cavalry reinforced the contact which continued until 2150 hours and resulted in 257 enemy killed and five captured. Seven US were killed and 27 wounded. On 4 May, the 4/23 Infantry (Mechanized), under the operational control of the 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division conducted blocking operations in the vicinity of Duc Hoa. At 1730 hours, four kilometers northeast of the town, Company A received small arms and automatic weapons fire from an unknown number of enemy. Returning the fire with small arms, automatic weapons and LAW, the unit killed 28 enemy and captured two, while losing one US killed and seven wounded. Throughout the area around Saigon, friendly forces were inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy in almost continuous engagements, but the enemy still pursued his desperate attempt to enter Saigon, placing heaviest pressure on the western accesses. Infiltration by small groups also took place, mainly through the western fringes of the city. Infiltration was conducted by various means. Some dressed in ARVN uniforms traveled by boat or vehicle into the CMC at night. In one instance an element attempted to infiltrate by hiding in a large box placed in the bed of a truck and covered with bricks. The attempt failed since the arrangement provided insufficient ventilation and the personnel inside suffocated. Many of the infiltration groups were detected and apprehended before they penetrated beyond the edge of the city.

(c) The Period 5 - 12 May.

1 5 May. At 0400 hours the enemy drive on Saigon started, with primary attacks coming from the west and north and diversionary attacks on the east. The attempt to take Saigon began with a pre-dawn mortar attack on the Newport Bridge (XS8994) followed by a ground attack by elements of the 4th Local Force Battalion and the 2/SR 4 Battalion. The mortar attack failed to damage the bridge, and the ground attack was halted by the 5th RVN Marine Battalion. An hour later the Binh Loi Bridge (XS8797) was attacked by elements of two battalions, K1 and K3 of the Dong Nai Regiment. The contact ended at 1700 hours when the enemy was repulsed by the 6th RVN Marine Battalion. Elements of the Viet Cong 3d Local Force Battalion plus one sapper company dressed in RVN Marine uniforms infiltrated into the southern edge of the city in the Tan My Tay area (XS8894) but were stopped by the 1st RVN Marine Battalion and National Police and forced to withdraw after suffering heavy losses. There were a number of significant contacts on 5 May in other areas. That afternoon, the 2/28 Infantry, of the 3d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, conducted operations between Phu Loi and Tan Uyen. At 1530 hours, about three kilometers west of Tay Uyen elements

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of Company D and L, 3/11 Armored Cavalry contacted an unknown number of enemy. In the three-hour engagement that followed, friendly forces killed 66 enemy while suffering two wounded. That same day, elements of Troops F and H, 2/11 Armored Cavalry, responded to a pre-dawn attack on the village of Cam My, 13 kilometers southwest of Duc Hoa. The enemy penetrated the Regional Force/Popular Force (RF/PF) perimeter and occupied part of Cam My. Near the village the two companies came under heavy small arms, RPG and mortar fire. At 0845 hours Troop E/2/11 Armored Cavalry reinforced the contact, which was also supported by light fire teams, artillery and airstrikes. The US forces linked up with ARVN elements in the area, and increased the pressure on the enemy. At 1600 hours the enemy withdrew, leaving 75 dead, five prisoners, seven crew served weapons and five small arms. Friendly forces lost four US killed and 11 wounded, one ARVN interpreter and three RF/PF killed and 11 RF/PF wounded and eight missing. Troop B/1/4 Cavalry of the 3d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, while conducting reconnaissance in force operations six kilometers southwest of Phu Loi, contacted an unknown size enemy force. Troop A reinforced and light fire teams of A/7/1 Air Cavalry supported. Enemy losses were 137 killed (66 credited to A/7/1 Air Cavalry). Friendly losses were 19 wounded. The following day, elements of the 1/4 Cavalry supported by artillery, airstrikes, light fire teams and AC47 (Spooky) continued to attack the enemy southwest of Phu Loi, killing 303 while suffering four US killed.

2 6 May. By 6 May, although heavy fighting continued in and around the Capital Military District, it became clear that the enemy offensive against Saigon would be defeated. Enemy elements continued attacking the city, but their forces were weak, command and control uncoordinated, and fighting elements disorganized. That day, II MFGF Forward Control Headquarters went into operation in Saigon under the command of Major General John H. Hay Jr, Deputy Commanding General, II MFGF. Designated Task Force Hay, the headquarters was formed to counter enemy threats to military installations in the Capital Military District and to monitor operations there. That same day, 1/5 Infantry (Mechanized) and 3/4 Cavalry (less Troop C) came under the operational control of Task Force Hay. These two units were immediately committed to drive enemy forces from the key villages of Ap Binh Long and Ap Hoc Thanh, two kilometers east of Saigon. In the ensuing assault on the villages 59 enemy were killed and the remainder driven out by the combined armor and infantry force. There were a number of other sizeable contacts on 6 May: Nine kilometers southwest of Tan Son Nhut Airbase, D/4/12 Infantry contacted an enemy force, and was reinforced by Troops C and D, 3/17 Air Cavalry. Artillery and light fire teams supported the contact in which 44 enemy were killed and 33 weapons captured. Friendly losses were one US killed and 12 wounded. Contacts that day in the 25th Infantry Division area west and northwest of the city resulted in 121 enemy killed, while elements of the division located more than 100 enemy dead from previous contacts. Meanwhile, the 7th RVN Airborne Battalion responded to intelligence reports that the French Cemetery (XS6194) on the western edge of Saigon was to become a

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rallying point for enemy forces planning to attack Capital Military District Compound three kilometers to the east. The battalion moved to that location, but found few enemy. It was later determined that these forces were to have been met by guides, but all but a few had been killed or captured by friendly forces, disrupting the enemy time schedule. A second infiltration of the French Cemetery was attempted the following day, but the 7th ARVN Airborne Battalion ambushed the enemy elements. Also on 6 May, elements of the 2d Independent Battalion, Phu Loi II Battalion and possibly the 5th Local Force Battalion attempted to cross the Kinh Doi Canal at the southern edge of Saigon, apparently with the intention of seizing the 8th Precinct. National Police units and elements of the ARVN Rangers halted them at the canal, while the 3/39 Infantry, 5/60 Infantry (Mechanized), 9th Infantry Division, and elements of the 2/27 Infantry from the 25th Infantry Division, attacked them from the rear. This engagement lasted six days, with the enemy on at least one occasion failing in an attempt to disengage and cross the canal to the east of the contact.

3 7 May. Fighting continued in many parts of Saigon and around Tan Son Nhut Airfield. On 7 May one of the key battles of the Saigon defense took place. The previous night, elements of 3/4 Cavalry had reinforced the critical area just west of the Saigon city limits which included the key villages of Ap Binh Long (XS7891) and Ap Hoc Thanh. The enemy appeared to place great importance on holding these villages; captured documents and prisoner reports later revealed that the enemy had been ordered to hold these villages at all costs. Task Force 1/5 Infantry (Mechanized) was sent into the area by Task Force Hay on 7 May, providing additional armored strength and a mobile reaction force for western Saigon. The two battalions were committed to break enemy strongholds in Ap Binh Long and Ap Hoc Thanh, which the enemy had fortified by converting drainage ditches into bunkers and covering them with logs and earth. After extensive air and artillery strikes and support from light fire teams, the friendly forces took the villages. The fall of these two strongpoints defeated the enemy's threat from the west, and the remainder of the fighting in this area became for the most part mopping-up operations. Meanwhile, on the south side of Saigon Company C, 5/60 Infantry (Mechanized) of the 9th Infantry Division contacted enemy elements two kilometers south of the city's border. The enemy force had been moving to reinforce an attempted crossing of Kinh Doi Canal by other units. Contact continued throughout the day and was reinforced by the remainder of the battalion and supported by light fire teams, airstrikes and artillery. Enemy losses in this action were 213 dead. Two Americans were killed. Also along the southern border of the city, about five kilometers southwest of the Phu Tho area of Saigon, D/4/12 Infantry contacted an enemy force. Shortly thereafter, Company A of the same battalion also made contact. At the time it was estimated that an enemy battalion was between the two companies. Companies A and D, 3/7 Infantry conducted airmobile assaults south of the 4/12 Infantry contact, with Company A on the west and Company D on the east. Both units

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quickly engaged the enemy, as light fire teams, artillery and airstrikes supported. Enemy losses from this engagement were 86 killed, while friendly forces suffered one killed and 12 wounded. (Contacts in this same area the following day resulted in another 50 enemy killed.) Five kilometers northwest of Tan Son Nhut Airbase, the 1/27 Infantry, with C/3/4 Cavalry under its operational control contacted an enemy force of unknown size. Artillery and light fire teams supported the action, which resulted in 134 enemy killed. Friendly forces lost four killed and 21 wounded. In the area northwest of Saigon, 25th Infantry Division contacts on 7 May resulted in 55 enemy killed in scattered actions.

4. 8-10 May. During the three days, 8-10 May, heavy fighting continued in and around Saigon. Toward the end of this period the enemy began to withdraw from the Saigon-Capital Military District area and to deploy into intermediate base areas to the north and west of Saigon. In anticipation of the enemy moves, Commanding General, II FFWV increased surveillance along the expected exfiltration routes. The 3d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division was assigned an area of operation north of the Long Binh/Bien Hoa complex and instructed to conduct intensive operations there and north of the Dong Nai River. The 9th Infantry Division was relieved of a security mission in the IV CZ and these forces made available to reinforce the units to the south of Saigon. On 8 May, the 3/30 Infantry, after conducting a combat assault one kilometer east of Highway 1, 54, along the southern boundary of Saigon, engaged a large enemy force. Light fire teams, artillery and airstrikes supported the contact. Four US were killed and 10 wounded, while the enemy suffered 57 killed. Several sharp contacts that day by other 9th Infantry Division elements resulted in an additional 58 enemy killed. North of Highway TL 10, one kilometer west of Saigon, B/3/4 Cavalry, under the operational control of Task Force Tay, engaged an unknown number of enemy in a contact that resulted in 39 enemy killed and nine US wounded. Along Highway QL 1, seven kilometers northwest of Tan Son Nhut Airbase, the 25th Infantry Division's 2/34 Armor contacted an enemy force at 1245 hours. The contact, supported by light fire teams, artillery and airstrikes, continued until 0200 hours and resulted in 44 enemy killed and two captured, while US forces lost one killed and two wounded. In another 25th Infantry Division action, Task Force 4/9 Infantry conducted a combat assault into the area 10 kilometers west of Tan Son Nhut at 1645 hours, and moving north-east received small arms, automatic weapons, RPG and 60mm mortar fire from an enemy force. The battalion returned fire with organic weapons, supported by light fire teams, artillery and airstrikes. The contact broke at 0410 hours 9 May, and resulted in 37 enemy killed, two captured, and three US wounded. Also on 9 May, twelve kilometers west of Saigon, B/3/47 Infantry (Mechanized) of the 9th Infantry Division, contacted an estimated two enemy companies. D/3/5 Cavalry supported the contact, which continued until almost dark. Eight US were killed and 32 wounded; enemy losses were 61 killed. In other 9th Infantry Division contacts that day, a total of 108 enemy were killed. Twelve kilometers west of Saigon along Highway TL 10, 1/27 Infantry of the 25th Infantry Division engaged an enemy force in a contact that lasted

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until 2130 hours. Supported by light fire teams, artillery, airstrikes and AC47 (Spooky), the battalion killed 66 of the enemy and captured three prisoners while suffering one US killed. In the Capital Military District, seven kilometers southwest of Tan Son Nhut, the 3/7 and 4/12 Infantry of the 199th Infantry Brigade contacted an enemy force resulting in 121 enemy killed. Other 1st Infantry Division contacts that day took an additional 100 enemy dead. Meanwhile, the enemy attempted to relieve pressure on his elements operating in the south and west of Saigon by initiating an assault by the 101st North Vietnamese Army Regiment from the north toward Tan Son Nhut Airbase. The 5th ARVN Airborne Battalion halted this attack in a battle that lasted for two days. The 101st Regiment, with a strength of approximately 1,000 men, was not able to move south of the point of contact, and was forced to disband into small groups and exfiltrate northward. On 10 May, with a view to intercepting enemy forces attempting to withdraw westward from the Saigon area, Commanding General, II FFORCEV directed Special Forces Detachment B-56 to conduct guerrilla operations in the Khien Wong Pineapple Plantation area, 15 kilometers west of the city. Fighting was still heavy in several areas immediately around Saigon. Elements of the 9th Infantry Division were engaged to the south of Saigon. At 1225 hours, Companies A and B, 3/39 Infantry contacted an enemy force two kilometers south of the city. The battalion's Reconnaissance Platoon reinforced the contact while artillery, light fire teams and airstrikes supported. Five US were killed while enemy losses were 65 dead. Other contacts by 9th Infantry Division units that day resulted in 58 enemy killed. An additional 51 enemy were killed in actions by elements of the 199th Infantry Brigade to the west and southwest of Saigon.

5 11-12 May. The focus shifted from Saigon to operations designed to interdict and destroy enemy forces attempting to withdraw from the Capital Military District. II FFORCEV and III Corps forces began to move to block exfiltration of VC/NVA units from the Saigon area to the camps and border areas. The 199th Infantry Brigade was placed under the operational control of the 25th Infantry Division, and instructed to prepare to move to the Boi Loi Wood/Trapezoid area to block likely routes of exfiltration and destroy enemy forces there. At the same time, Company A, 5th Special Forces was directed to initiate operations in the Tra Cu - Duc Huu area, employing Detachments B-36 and A-302 (Mobile Strike Force) to detect and report on enemy locations, and to conduct guerrilla operations to destroy enemy forces there. On 12 May, Commanding General, II FFORCEV informed his major commanders that the second major offensive had failed to secure any of its main objectives, stating that, despite his losses, the enemy was continuing attacks by fire on key installations to "maintain conspicuous pressure" on the US/GVN during the period of negotiations. Also on that date, the 1st Australian Task Force moved from the vicinity of Nui Dat in Phuoc Tuy Province to take up positions in the Catcher's Mitt area, some 20 kilometers north of Bien Hoa and east of Highway 1A, with the mission of interdicting enemy movement between Saigon and a staging area in that region. The enemy responded immediately to this intrusion into one of his critical areas.

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That night, First Support Base CORAL, occupied by the 1st Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment (RAR), received heavy fire from mortars, small arms and automatic weapons, followed by a determined ground attack. The Australian elements employed organic weapons, light fire teams, artillery and airstrikes. Contact was lost at 0800 hours when the enemy withdrew. In the action, nine Australians were killed and 29 wounded. A total of 51 enemy were killed, one prisoner captured and three detainees apprehended. The 1st Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment also captured 21 small arms and seven RPG launchers. This was only the first of a number of attacks the enemy was to launch against Australian forces in the Capital's first. Meanwhile, on 11 May action continued around Saigon. The 4/9 Infantry, with B/6/31 Infantry and B/3/60 Infantry under its operational control, contacted an enemy force some five kilometers northeast of Tay Son, maintaining intermittent contact throughout the day. Friendly forces were supported by airstrikes, artillery and light fire teams. In the day's fighting three US were killed and 30 wounded; the enemy lost 107 killed. The following day, B/6/31 Infantry engaged an enemy force two kilometers south of Saigon (XS8487). This contact, which was supported by light fire teams and artillery, resulted in 35 enemy killed. Other elements of the 9th Infantry Division accounted for an additional 60 enemy killed. Also on 12 May, elements of the 4/9 Infantry, of the 25th Infantry Division, in a night defensive position five kilometers northwest of Tay Son shut, fought off a heavy ground attack. The battalion employed organic weapons and was supported by artillery, light fire teams and airstrikes. Five US were killed and 24 wounded; the enemy lost 68 killed. Several contacts by division forces that day resulted in an additional 115 enemy dead. The date, 12 May, marks the end of the three-phase offensive against Saigon. On that date, Task Force May was disestablished, and forces under its operational control returned to their parent organizations. The aggressive action of the US/GVN/USAF units in and around Saigon stopped the enemy offensive and killed what was to have been both a major military and a major propaganda victory for the enemy. Elements of eight regiments and three separate battalions, amounting to some 6,000 troops, had been identified in the Capital Military District, but elements of only 13 battalions, with a strength estimated at 4,000 men, had managed to enter the city of Saigon. With the attacks broken up and units dispersed and destroyed, the enemy troops were exfiltrating from the city, many of them dressed in civilian clothes. Sweeps throughout the CND would continue for a week or more to clean out remnants of enemy units unable to leave the city.

(d) 13 - 30 May. During this period forces under the operational control of 11 FFORCEV continued operations in the provinces around Saigon to destroy enemy forces and to intercept and destroy enemy units along withdrawal routes from Saigon. The enemy continued to harass the Saigon area, but his forces were broken up into small groups and had lost much of their effectiveness. Seventeen battalions of the 1st, 9th and 25th Infantry Divisions, and the 199th Infantry Brigade continued to operate during the early part of this period in the CND outside Saigon. Beyond occasional

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harassing attacks the enemy generally avoided contact as he attempted to move into intermediate base areas, to resupply, re-equip and reorganize his forces. On 13 May, Reconnaissance Platoon, 2/3 Infantry, under the operational control of the 199th Infantry Brigade, contacted an enemy force six kilometers southwest of Saigon. Company A, 5/12 Infantry reinforced; light fire teams, artillery and airstrikes supported. The contact resulted in 65 enemy and three US killed. The following day, the 2/3 Infantry occupied a night defensive position five kilometers southwest of Tan Son Nhut Airbase. At 0255 hours, Companies A, B and C received small arms and automatic weapons fire from an enemy force. Fire was returned with organic weapons and artillery, light fire teams and airstrikes. When the contact ended, the enemy had lost 91 killed, while the battalion suffered six killed. An additional 85 enemy were killed that day in other contacts in the 25th Infantry Division area. The following day, A/3/4 Cavalry contacted an enemy force five kilometers southwest of Ben Suc (XT5630). The contact was reinforced by Troop C and supported by light fire teams, artillery and airstrikes. Eighty-nine enemy were killed; the battalion lost five dead. Also on 15 May, the 1st Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment, occupying Fire Support Base CORAL seven kilometers northwest of Tan Uyen, received a ground attack by an estimated enemy battalion supported by mortars and RPG fire. The Australian force employed organic weapons, artillery, light fire teams and airstrikes, and in the two-hour contact killed 37 enemy and captured one prisoner and 28 weapons, while losing five killed and 17 wounded. On 17 and 18 May, contacts were scattered, however the enemy continued to take heavy casualties, as indicated by the fact that the 25th Infantry Division alone on 17 May accounted for 100 killed, and on 18 May, the 9th Infantry Division forces killed 76 enemy. On 22 May, Commanding General, II FFORCLV returned the 199th Infantry Brigade, less one battalion, to the operational control of II FFORCLV and the brigade began operations between Phuoc Vinh and the Dong Nai River, and undertook the ground, mortar and rocket defense of the Long Binh/Bien Hoa complex. On 22 May a large contact occurred five kilometers northeast of Duc Hoa. The 4/9 Infantry occupied a night defensive position and at 0155 hours the battalion received mortar and RPG fire followed by a ground attack. Friendly forces called in airstrikes, artillery, light fire teams and AC47 (Spooky). Forty-eight enemy killed were located on the battlefield when the attack ended, and at daylight an additional 16 enemy dead were found. On 24 May, Detachment B-56, Special Forces, was instructed to terminate operations in the Khien Quong Pineapple Plantation area west of Saigon, and conduct operations in the Trapezoid area to detect and destroy enemy forces. That same day, the 3d Brigade, 101st Air Cavalry Division, began a move to the II CTZ, where it would operate with the remainder of the division until 9 June. On 25-26 May a number of contacts occurred along the northern edge of Saigon, as intelligence sources reported enemy movements back toward Saigon from the northwest and southeast. Several new attacks by fragmented enemy elements took place through 30 May, but were defeated by the aggressive US/GVN forces in the Capital Military District, and the remnants of these enemy forces again withdrew. The enemy continued to take heavy losses as friendly forces blocked his movements. On 26 May an attack was initiated by an estimated enemy battalion against a night

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defensive position of the 4/23 Infantry (Mechanized) about five kilometers west of Saigon (XS7691). Beginning at 2250 hours, the battalion received small arms, automatic weapons and RPG fire, followed by a probing attack. Contact continued throughout the night, and at 0515 hours the enemy launched a heavy ground attack. The battalion employed organic weapons, supported by artillery, light fire teams, airstrikes and AC47 (Spooky). Troops A and C, 3/4 Cavalry reinforced and established contact at 1145 hours one kilometer south of the defensive position. All units maintained contact with the enemy through most of the day, killing 233 while losing six US. During the remainder of the period, the enemy continued small-scale attacks on Saigon. On 31 May, Phase I of Campaign TUAN THANG was terminated. During Phase I, which began 8 April, the enemy lost 7,645 killed, 104 captured, five ralliers, 1,544 detainees, 1,505 small arms, and 499 crew served weapons. US/FMRF forces suffered 587 killed, including 21 Australians, one New Zealander and one Thai, and 3,719 wounded, including 86 Australians, nine Thais and four New Zealanders. The weapons the enemy lost were sufficient to equip the combat elements of two regiments.

(e) 1 - 30 June.

1 Phase II of Campaign TUAN THANG began on 1 June. During the month that followed, forces under the operational control of Commanding General, II FFORCEV, in close cooperation with GVN forces, conducted operations to destroy enemy elements harassing Saigon, and to interdict and destroy elements infiltrating into the III CTZ. On 4 June, in response to increased enemy attacks by rockets and mortars, II FFORCEV reactivated the Hurricane Forward Headquarters in Saigon. At that time, forces operating in the Capital Military District included, in addition to Vietnamese forces, up to nine US maneuver battalions from the 1st, 9th and 25th Infantry Divisions. The enemy continued to harass Saigon, by conducting numerous rocket attacks against the city and Tan Son Nhut Airbase in an attempt to maintain pressure on Saigon during the Paris negotiations. Contacts occurred primarily at the northern and western boundaries of the city, but enemy elements also on occasion attempted to operate to the south and southwest of the city. On 5 June General Hay was designated Senior Advisor to the Commanding General, Capital Military District and Military Governor of Saigon, and was instructed to exercise operational control of the defense and security of US installations in Saigon and vicinity. Task Force Hay received operational control of the 1/5 Infantry (Mechanized), 3/39 Infantry augmented by one mechanized infantry company, and Troop I, 3/11 Armored Cavalry Regiment. On 12 June in response to frequent enemy rocket and mortar attacks fired into civilian areas of Saigon, Commanding General II FFORCEV allocated additional ground forces and air assets to strengthen the Capital Military District against attacks by indirect fire. This defense grew during the month into a comprehensive combined operation, involving airborne surveillance, day and night patrolling, counter-mortar radar, ground operations, artillery, tracker dog teams, and a network of towers which provided a flash base with a 360-degree coverage of Saigon and the surrounding area. As a

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result of these actions and intensive search operations in which large numbers of enemy rockets and mortar rounds were captured, by 17 June attacks on Saigon by indirect fire had virtually ceased. By 19 June, the enemy started to disengage in the Saigon area, and for the remainder of the month, with the exception of occasional harassing attacks by fire against Saigon and friendly installations, generally avoided contact and attempted to re-equip and reorganize in outlying base areas. As the month progressed, friendly forces employed both ground forces and a determined program of B-52 strikes to reach out to strike at enemy base areas, inflicting huge losses in equipment and personnel. (By mid-July it would be estimated that since the initiation of the 5 May offensive the enemy lost enough equipment to outfit 38 battalions.) On 21 June, Task Force Hay was redesignated Capital Military Assistance Command (CMAC), a permanent headquarters carrying out the missions previously assigned to Task Force Hay. On 26 June, B/7/1 Air Cavalry passed to the operational control of CMAC and commenced armed aerial reconnaissance in Gia Dinh Province and in the outer rocket belt to destroy the enemy's rocket launching capability. On 27 June, CMAC assumed responsibility for the rocket-mortar defense of Saigon and Tan Son Nhut Airbase. Through the remainder of June, CMAC continued offensive operations to locate and destroy the enemy in and around the Capital Military District.

2 Operations in Outlying Areas. At the beginning of June, II FFORCEV forces were operating as follows: 1st Infantry Division, conducting offensive operations to the north of Saigon and astride Highway 13, and security operations out of Quan Loi, Song Be and Phuoc Vinh; 9th Infantry Division, reconnaissance in force operations south and southwest of Saigon along Highway QL 4 in the southwest, and astride the Vam Co Tay River to the south of Saigon; 25th Infantry Division, reconnaissance in force operations to the west and northwest of Saigon; 199th Infantry Brigade, operations to secure the Long Binh/Bien Hoa complex, and battalion-size offensive operations north of the Dong Nai River, and the 1st Australian Task Force with the 1st and 2d Battalions, Royal Australian Regiment, operations north of Bien Hoa, interdicting enemy movement between War Zone "D" and the Saigon area. The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment was engaged in a number of support and security missions, its squadrons for the most part under the operational control of other headquarters. There were a number of significant contacts. The first took place on 2 June, when D/3/4 Cavalry light fire teams engaged an enemy force entrenched in bunkers and fortified positions eight kilometers northeast of Cu Chi. Airstrikes, artillery and additional light fire teams supported the contact, which resulted in 38 enemy killed with no friendly losses. In early June II FFORCEV instructed the 1st Australian Task Force to terminate operations in the Catcher's Mitt and on 5-6 June the Australian forces returned to Nui Dat. In less than four weeks of operations in the Catcher's Mitt area, the Australian forces had killed 219 enemy and captured 13 prisoners, 88 small arms and 41 crew served weapons. A total of 20 Australians were killed and 95 wounded. With the movement of the Australian Force from the Catcher's Mitt, the 1st Infantry Division was directed to

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commence operations there. On 9 June a number of units were changed: 3d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, on 28 June redeployed to the 101st Air Cavalry Division, returned from II CTZ and was ordered to relieve the 199th Infantry Brigade of the Phuoc Vinh and Song Thon bridge security missions under the operational control of the 25th Infantry Division, effective 13 June; the 199th Infantry Brigade was directed to initiate offensive operations in the vicinity of Cay Cao Rubber Plantation 30 kilometers northeast of Bien Hoa; Company A, 5th Special Forces Group was instructed to commence operations on 23 June to destroy enemy forces in the Chi Linh and Dong Xoai areas. On 13 June the 1st Air Cavalry Task Force assumed responsibility from the 199th Infantry Brigade for the Long Binh/Bien Hoa defense mission. On 15 June in a significant combat the 2/27 Infantry of the 25th Infantry Division was attacked by a Viet Cong defensive position eight kilometers northeast of Duc Hoa. The attack began at 0250 hours with mortar and RPG fire followed by a ground attack from an estimated enemy battalion. Friendly forces were supported by the 3rd Air Cavalry, airstrikes, artillery and A-1H (Snoopy). When the enemy withdrew, 44 killed and 46 weapons. Friendly losses were three killed. Contacts during the remainder of June continued light. During June, 33,100 other PWMAF killed 1603 enemy, apprehended 468 detainees, received six railcars and captured 71 prisoners, 611 small arms, 113 crew served weapons, 78 rockets and 178 tons of rice, while losing 187 killed, 1,036 wounded and one missing in action.

(f) 1 - 31 July. During July, the enemy for the most part remained in base areas to resupply and re-equip his forces. Realizing that the heavy losses he had taken in May and June, and the aggressiveness of friendly forces in defending Saigon, the enemy was forced to postpone, if not forego for the foreseeable future, plans to initiate another major offensive against Saigon. Intelligence reports indicated that the enemy was conducting a massive reappraisal of his capabilities and formulating future plans of action. As in late June, the enemy was limited in maintaining his presence in the III CTZ by means of harassing attacks on friendly installations and lines of communication. Friendly forces under the operational control of II FFGCEV initiated operations designed to clear remaining enemy elements from the area around the Capital Military District, to interdict enemy lines of communication and to prevent attacks upon friendly installations. Ground contacts through July continued light, with no major actions taking place to the south and southwest of Saigon in Long An Province. On 5 July, forces under the operational control of CNAC were strengthened through the addition of the 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, 1/6 Infantry (Mechanized) on 2/27 and 4/9 Infantry, B/3/17 Air Cavalry and Troop B/7/1 Cavalry. The 199th Infantry Brigade continued under the command's operational control. On 7 July, plans were announced to adjust Tactical Areas of Responsibility (TAOR) and Tactical Areas of Interest (TAOI) necessitated by the impending move of the 9th Infantry Division base from Bearcat to Long Tam, in the IV CTZ. This

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move began about 15 July and is scheduled for completion by 30 September. The 9th Infantry Division TAOI has previously included Long Khanh, Bien Hoa and a portion of Phuoc Tuy Province. With operations of the 9th Division increasingly focused on the region south of Saigon and within the IV CTZ, the division was no longer in a favorable position to conduct operations in the eastern portion of the TAOI. Accordingly, the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, 1st Infantry Division and the Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force, which would replace the RTAVR, were assigned portions of the zone. On 12 and 13 July upon direction of II FFORCEV, Company A, 5th Special Forces initiated operations in Ben Soi - Straight Edge Woods Area and south and east of the Binh Son Rubber Plantation to locate and destroy enemy elements operating in those regions. On 14 July, Capital Military Assistance Command was assigned to Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, and placed under the operational control of Commanding General, II FFORCEV. On 15 July in a significant action three kilometers west of Rach Kien, E/2/39 Infantry engaged what later was determined to have been a battalion sized enemy force. The contact, which continued for some 20 hours, was reinforced by A, B and C, 2/39 Infantry; A, B and C, 2/60 Infantry; A/5/60 Infantry (Mechanized); A, B and E, 4/39 Infantry and A/3/17 Air Cavalry. The contact resulted in seven US killed and 20 wounded, 74 enemy killed, one Hoi Chanh, nine detainees, and 13 small arms and six crew served weapons captured. The following day, another action occurred in the area 11 kilometers north of Loc Ninh. Troops A and C, 1/11 Armored Cavalry Regiment under the operational control of 1st Infantry Division received RPG and small arms fire from an unknown number of enemy. Artillery, tactical airstrikes and light fire teams supported the contact, which lasted for an hour and a half and resulted in seven US wounded, 10 enemy killed and three small arms and five crew served weapons captured. Forty minutes later, in the same vicinity, Troop B engaged another force, supported by artillery, light fire teams and airstrikes. The contact continued for three hours, resulting in four US killed and 16 wounded, 24 enemy killed and three prisoners captured. On 18 July, Company F (Long Range Patrol), 51st Infantry was assigned responsibility for the defense of the Long Binh/Bien Hoa complex, with the 36th Ranger Battalion (ARVN) and the 361 Mobile Strike Force Battalion in direct support and Troop D/3/17 Air Cavalry, and Troop E/2/11 Armored Cavalry Regiment under the company's operational control. The 3d and 4th Battalions, RAR moved from the Long Binh/Bien Hoa area to commence operations in the Hat Dich area to locate and destroy enemy elements believed to be operating in this habitual base area. Throughout the remainder of the month contacts continued light and sporadic. As July ended, RVN and allied forces planned operations designed to reach out and destroy the enemy in base areas in the northern and western portions of the III CTZ. The disposition of forces under the operational control of II FFORCEV remained substantially as it had been during late June. The threat to Saigon had not yet subsided, and sizeable numbers of forces continued to be centered around Saigon to insure its defense. Significant enemy losses for Phase II, Campaign TOAN THANG include 2,576 killed, 10 ralliers, 139 prisoners, 1,217 detainees, 934 small arms and 164 crew

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served weapons. US/FMAF losses were 322 killed (5 Australians and three Thais), and 1,947 wounded (including 37 Australians and 17 Thais). For both Phase I and II of Campaign TOAN THANG, enemy losses were 10,221 killed, 15 ralliers, 303 prisoners, 2,761 detainees, 2,439 small arms and 663 crew served weapons; friendly losses were 909 killed (including 26 Australians, four Thais and one New Zealander), 5,666 wounded (including 123 Australians, 26 Thais and four New Zealanders). Phase II of Campaign TOAN THANG continues.

(2) Operations in the IV CTZ.

(a) Operation PEOPLES ROAD. This operation began on 17 March to provide security for engineer construction on Highway QL4 between Cai Lay and My Tho, and continued through 21 May without significant contact. During this period, forces engaged in PEOPLES ROAD were the 2/39th and 2/60th Infantry, 9th Infantry Division, supported by Troop D, 3/5 Cavalry. On 22 May, Operation PEOPLES ROAD was combined with Operation TRUNG CONG DINH.

(b) Operation TRUNG CONG DINH. Operation TRUNG CONG DINH was initiated on 7 March 1968 as a combined strike operation composed of elements of the 9th Infantry Division in close cooperation and coordination with the 7th ARVN Division to locate and destroy enemy forces in Dinh Tuong Province. At the beginning of this reporting period the task organization included the 3/47 and 4/47 Infantry and the 2d Marine Battalion (VMSB). Enemy forces conducted reconnaissance in force and mobile riverine operations in the area of operation. There were a number of significant contacts. On 15 May, 10 kilometers southwest of Ben Tre, the 3/47 Infantry conducted a reconnaissance in force operation. At 0545 hours, Company A engaged an enemy force, but immediately lost contact. Two kilometers to the southeast, Company A made contact with an estimated enemy company. Companies C and E, 3/47 Infantry and the 4/47 Infantry reinforced, supported by airstrikes. Fighting continued throughout the day, resulting in 42 enemy killed, while friendly forces lost six killed and 16 wounded. From 17 - 19 May, Operation TRUNG CONG DINH was suspended, while the 3/47 and 4/47 Infantry conducted mobile riverine operations under the operational control of 2d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division. On 20 May, the operation was resumed with the 2/60 and 3/47 Infantry, and continued until 22 May, when it was combined with Operation PEOPLES ROAD.

(c) Operation TRUNG CONG DINH/PEOPLES ROAD. Operation TRUNG CONG DINH/PEOPLES ROAD began on 22 May. The 1st Brigade, 9th Infantry Division with the 2/39 Infantry, 2/60 Infantry and D/4/5 Cavalry continued security operations on Highway QL4. The 2d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division with the 3/47 Infantry and 4/47 Infantry continued the TRUNG CONG DINH mission by conducting riverine and reconnaissance operations in the south. On 3 June, 10 kilometers northeast of Cai Lay, Companies A and E, 2/39 Infantry contacted an enemy force of unknown size. Heavy fighting continued from 1000 hours until 2100 hours, supported by B/7/1 Air Cavalry and reinforced by the 2/60 Infantry (-) Task Force Joseph (C/2/60 and C/4/47 Infantry). Known results that night were 19 US killed and 48 wounded, 62 enemy killed and 25

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Small arms captured. Sweeps the following day revealed an additional 127 enemy dead, 22 small arms and nine crew served weapons left behind by the enemy. Total enemy losses were 189 killed and 47 small arms and nine crew served weapons captured. On 8 June, in another major action, Company A/2/60 Infantry contacted an enemy force of unknown size six kilometers north of Cai Lay. Company C, 2/60 Infantry reinforced the contact, which was supported by airstrikes and resulted in 83 enemy killed, 20 detainees apprehended and one prisoner and 12 small arms captured. Three US were killed and 15 wounded in the contact. On 17 June, Company A, 3/39 Infantry engaged an enemy force 14 kilometers northwest of My Tho. The contact, reinforced by Company C, 3/39 Infantry, resulted in 62 enemy killed, three detainees apprehended and 24 small arms and two crew served weapons captured. Fourteen US were wounded in the action. On 30 July the PEOPLES ROAD portion of the operation terminated. Operation TRUONG CONG DINH continues with the 3/60 and 4/47 Infantry. Significant results of Operation TRUONG CONG DINH/PEOPLES ROAD are 1,703 enemy killed, 1,907 detainees apprehended, two ralliers and 18 prisoners, 307 small arms and 35 crew served weapons captured. Friendly losses were 163 killed, 1,073 wounded and 11 missing.

(d) Operation KUDZU. Operation KUDZU commenced 1 May, replacing Operation HOPTAC I, with the same mission of securing the Dong Tam base camp. At the beginning of the period the operation was conducted by 3/60 Infantry, with another company under its operational control as the situation demanded. On 25 May the 3/60 Infantry was replaced by the 4/47 Infantry. On 6 July, 3/47 Infantry was assigned to conduct the operation. There were no major contacts. Significant losses for the period included 65 enemy killed, 393 detainees, and eight prisoners and 11 small arms captured. Friendly losses were seven killed and 161 wounded.

(3) Aviation Operations.

(a) Army Aviation.

1 Resources. The following non-divisional resources were under the operational control of II FFORCEV during the reporting period:

a Rotary Wing.

13 Assault Helicopter Companies.

1 Armed Helicopter Company.

4 Assault Support Helicopter Companies (Medium).

1 Assault Support Helicopter Company (Heavy).

1 Aviation Company (Corps).

1 Air Cavalry Squadron.

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b Fixed-Wing.

2 Reconnaissance Airplane Companies.

1 Utility Airplane Company.

1 Surveillance Airplane Company.

c The total authorized aircraft inventory decreased from 708 helicopters and 85 airplanes at the beginning of the reporting period to 630 helicopters and 85 airplanes at the end of the period. This reduction resulted when operational control of the 7th Reconnaissance Squadron, 1st Air Cavalry was transferred to the Senior Advisor, IV ARVN Corps on 3 June 1968. At the close of the report period there were 572 helicopters and 80 airplanes assigned. Operational guidance was provided by the Commanding General and implemented by the G-2 in surveillance and reconnaissance functions, and by the G-3 in air cavalry, combat assault, airmobile, and general support functions. Command, less operational control, continues to be exercised by the 12th Combat Aviation Group through six Combat Aviation Battalions.

2 Allocation and Employment. Aviation resources continued to be allocated to major units based upon the overall tactical plan envisioned by Commanding General, II FFORCEV or as directed by higher headquarters. Support was provided all US and allied organizations under the operational control of II FFORCEV and to III ARVN Corps. The number of assault helicopter companies (AHC) continued to be insufficient to satisfy all valid requirements. Sixteen AHC could have been employed effectively throughout the period. It is anticipated that 17 AHC will be required during the next quarter. This increase is the result of the arrival of an additional major maneuver force, the Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force. The number of assault support helicopter companies assigned is adequate, and sufficient fixed wing aircraft are currently authorized.

3. Increased Firefly effort. Additional emphasis was placed on waterway interdiction at night in the area west of Saigon using Firefly helicopter gun teams. A total of 426 sampans were destroyed in the period 1 May through 31 July 1968. Initially, one Firefly team was committed each night for six hours. At the close of the period the number of teams had been raised to four. The result of this increase was that 301 of the 426 sampans were destroyed in the month of July.

(b) Employment of B-52 Strikes.

1 During this reporting period a program was developed utilizing massive B-52 strikes in a maneuver role. The purpose of the program was to:

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- a Destroy enemy forces.
- b Interdict the infiltration of enemy fillers to hostile units that had been in contact in and around the CMD.
- c Destroy known base areas to deny the enemy the use of these areas for training, resupply and rest.
- d Interdict resupply of food, equipment and ammunition.

2 There is conclusive evidence that numerous enemy have been killed, harassed and confused to the point where offensive operations have been impossible in III CTZ. Additionally enemy plans for the third phase of offensive have been delayed. The fact that enemy forces have failed to attain their forecasted schedule can be credited in large measures to the effective B-52 programs.

3 Inclosure 6 shows a statistical summary of B-52 strikes employed in the III CTZ during the period.

(4) Chemical Operations.

(a) A regular program of persistent CS drops directed by this headquarters was initiated on 20 June 1968. This program supplements the persistent CS drops directed by division commanders. CS riot control agent was placed on selected enemy base camps and infiltration routes to harass him and restrict his use of those areas. The division in whose TAOI the selected targets are located clears the target with the appropriate military and civil authorities and makes the drops.

(b) In the six weeks of the reporting period this program was in operation, 11 persistent CS drops were made at direction of this headquarters. Five were in the 1st Infantry Division TAOI, four were in the TAOI of the 9th Infantry Division, and two were in the 25th Infantry Division TAOI. All the target areas covered enemy base camps along actively used infiltration routes.

(5) Training.

(a) The ARVN Infantry/Ranger Battalion Refresher Training Program was reinitiated in June. Thirty-five battalions are scheduled to undergo the refresher training during the next year. Two battalions completed refresher training during July and two other battalions were in training at the end of July.

(b) Reciprocal Mobile Training Teams (RMTT) were exchanged between the 1st Infantry Division and the 5th ARVN Division, the 25th Infantry and the 7th ARVN Division during the reporting period. This program involves an

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exchange of training teams between the US and ARVN units. The type of training conducted by the RMIT depends on the needs of the particular unit.

(c) RECONDO School. Twenty-six members of the RTAVF Long Range Patrol Company attended RECONDO School at Nha Trang during July. This training is part of the unit's in-country training program. Other members of the company are scheduled to attend the school during the next month.

(6) Force Structure. The following changes occurred in force structure during the period of this report:

(a) Gains:

1 Elements of the first increment of the Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force (RTAVF) begin arriving in RVN on 25 June. A quartering party arrived on 25 June. The advance party arrived on 2 July. The 1st Infantry Battalion, Cavalry Troop (+), Engineer Company (+), Military Police Company (-), Aviation Section, Military Intelligence Detachment (-), and Signal Battalion (-) arrived on 22 July. The 2d Infantry Battalion, Direct Support Supply and Service Company (-), Administration Company (-), Division Headquarters (forward) and Headquarters and Headquarters Company (-) Division Artillery Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, Support Group Headquarters and Maintenance Forward Support Company arrived on 29 July. Other elements are scheduled to close on 5 August 1968.

2 The 272d Assault Helicopter Company was assigned to 12th Combat Aviation Group on 20 May.

3 The following radar detachments were reassigned from 97th Artillery Group to II FFORCEV effective 6 May.

- a 6th Field Artillery Detachment
- b 9th Field Artillery Detachment
- c 67th Infantry Detachment
- d 76th Field Artillery Detachment
- e 79th Field Artillery Detachment
- f 231st Field Artillery Detachment
- g 246th Field Artillery Detachment
- h 247th Field Artillery Detachment
- i 248th Field Artillery Detachment
- j 249th Field Artillery Detachment

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4 The following radar detachments were assigned to II FFORCEV on  
30 June:

- a 257th Field Artillery Detachment
- b 258th Field Artillery Detachment
- c 259th Field Artillery Detachment
- d 260th Field Artillery Detachment

(b) Losses:

1 The 272d Assault Helicopter Company was reassigned from 12th Combat  
Aviation Group to 101st Air Cavalry Division effective 1 July.

2 The 361st Armored Helicopter Company was reassigned from 12th Combat  
Aviation Group to 17th Combat Aviation Group effective 27 May.

3 The 2/11 Artillery was reassigned from 23d Artillery Group to  
the 101st Air Cavalry Division effective 10 June. The unit had been attached  
to 101st Air Cavalry Division.

4 The 1/83 Artillery was reassigned from 54th Artillery Group to  
Provisional Corps Vietnam (PCV) effective 1 June. The unit had been attached  
to PCV.

5 Battery G (.50 Caliber Machinegun), 55th Artillery was assigned from  
II FFORCEV to Americal Division effective 1 July. The unit had been attached  
to Americal Division.

6 The 6/77 Artillery deployed to IV CTZ and was placed under the  
operational control of the Senior Advisor, IV Corps effective approximately  
20 July.

7 Elements of RTAVR began redeploying to Thailand on 9 July. The  
quartering party returned on 9 July. The RTAVR Engineer Company (less 1  
Platoon) returned on 16 July. The advance party and one engineer platoon  
returned on 27 July.

(7) Operations of Company F (Long Range Patrol), 51st Infantry.

(a) Combat Operations. During the period 1 May to 31 July, Company  
F participated in Campaign TOAN THANG, performing largely trail-watch mis-  
sions until mid-July, when the company was assigned the defense of the  
Long Binh/Bien Hoa complex.

1 From 1 to 23 May, Company F operated under the operation control

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of the 3d Brigade, 101st Air Cavalry Division, and from 24 May until 20 June, under the operational control of the 199th Infantry Brigade (Separate) (light). From 21 to 26 June, the company operated southwest of Phuoc Vinh and in the area five kilometers east of Phuoc Vinh, under the operational control of II FFORCEV and in direct support of the 3d Brigade, 101st Air Cavalry Division. From 28 June until 18 July, Company F was under the operational control of II FFORCEV in the area 10 kilometers north-east of Long Binh.

2 On 18 July, the company undertook the defense of the Long Binh/Lien Hoa complex, a mission it retained through the remainder of the reporting period. The company headed a task force composed of the 36th Ranger Battalion (ARVN); the 361st Mobile Strike Force (CIDG) Battalion; Troop D, 3/17 Air Cavalry; Troop E, 2/11 Armored Cavalry, and Troop K, 3/11 Armored Cavalry. Elements of this task force conducted 61 reconnaissance in force operations and deployed some 300 ambushes and 56 long range patrol operations. Significant results for the 18-31 July period were 13 enemy killed, one small arm captured, and five friendly personnel wounded.

3 During the period 1 May to 31 July, Company F inserted 234 light reconnaissance teams and 17 heavy combat teams. These elements made 284 separate enemy sightings and became engaged with enemy forces on 115 occasions. As a result of these operations the enemy lost 48 killed, four captured, 39 detainees, 13 small arms and one RPG-2 rocket and launcher, as opposed to friendly losses of 29 wounded.

## (b) Unit Administration.

1 Due to personnel shortages it was necessary to reduce the strength of patrols from six to five men each, to maintain the desired 28 patrols operational. Not all of the shortage could be charged to a lack of assigned personnel, although this was a major factor between 1 May and 15 July. Many operational man days were lost as a result of leaves, hospitalization and convalescence from wounds. At the close of the period the company, which is authorized nine officers and 221 enlisted men, had an excess of 12 enlisted men. This overage is expected to be dissipated in August as a result of rotational losses.

2 Supply support continued to be adequate with the exception of two items.

a Survival knives, a critical item to this unit, remained in short supply. A total of 140 are needed.

b The 30-round magazines for the M-16 rifle have been requisitioned, but not received. The use of these magazines will provide valuable additional firepower and facilitate carrying ammunition during patrol operations.

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e. Logistics and Transportation.

(1) The 3d Brigade, 101st Air Cavalry Division was deployed to II CTZ by USAF C130 airlift. (See Lessons Learned).

(2) See Inclosure 1 for a summary of USAF C130/C123 sorties flown in support of II FFORCEV units during the reporting period.

(3) The exchange program to equip all units with diesel-powered Armored Personnel Carriers was completed on schedule, 31 May 1968.

(4) The exchange of M109, 155mm Self Propelled Howitzers for the newest models continued during the quarter. The exchange is completed in all II FFORCEV units except the 1st Infantry Division and the 23d Artillery Group. Target date for completion is 31 August 1968.

(5) A program to replace M101A1 towed howitzers with the M102 model was begun this quarter. One battery of the 2/13 Artillery, 23d Artillery Group has been completed. Progress will be dependent on availability of the M102 in the supply system. The completion date of the program cannot be forecasted at this time.

(6) Forty-five AH-1G (Cobra) helicopters were received during the period. Issues were as follows:

27 ea	3/17 Cavalry Squadron
9 ea	3/4 Cavalry, 25th Infantry Division
9 ea	3/5 Cavalry, 9th Infantry Division

(7) Sixty-two OH-6A (Cayuse) helicopters were received by II FFORCEV and were issued as follows:

50 ea	12th Aviation Group
12 ea	1st Infantry Division

(8) The average operational readiness for the OH-6A helicopters was below established criteria during the period. The contributing factors were: a fuel line defect, tail rotor assemblies, main rotor blades and increased combat losses.

(9) Preparations were made for the receipt and support of the first increment, RTAVF, at Bearcat and accompanying US liaison personnel at Bearcat. The RTAVF were supported initially by the US 9th Infantry Division, later to be supported by US Army Support Command, Saigon. The US liaison personnel received their support from HEC, II FFORCEV. Direction was given to transfer TA equipment and supplies necessary for perimeter defense from the US 9th Infantry Division to RTAVF preliminary to assuming responsibility for the defense of Bearcat.

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(10) During the period the fortification of critical bridges in III CTZ was improved. A source of compressed air was established at Tan Son Nhut and Bien Hoa airbases enabling ARVN divers to conduct underwater inspections of piers and bridges in the III CTZ.

(11) Ammunition, a critical commodity in the command, required intensive management during the period. Items of ammunition in short supply are managed by means of assigning to each item an Available Supply Rate (ASR), a usage rate expressed in rounds per weapon per day which can be supported by available stocks. At the end of the current period, the following 16 ammunition items were on ASR:

## CODE

## ITEM

A165	Ctg, 7.62mm, Ball and Tracer, Lkd (Minigun)
B554	Ctg, 40mm Multiple Projectile, f/M79 Lehr
B568	Ctg, 40mm HE, f/M79 Lehr
B610	Ctg and Lehr, CS, E8
C251	Ctg, 81mm, Illum, f/Mortar M29
G445/Subs	Ctg, 105mm, HE, f/Howitzer
G454	Ctg, 105mm, Smoke, WP, f/Howitzer
D572	Projectile, 175mm, HE, f/Gun
G809/890	Grenade, Hand, Fragmentation, M26
G945	Grenade, Hand, Smoke, Yellow
H555	Rkt, ES, 66mm (LAW)
K143/Subs	Mine, Antipersonnel, M18 (Claymore)
K764	Chemical Agent, CS-1
L307	Sig, Illum, Grd, White, Star Cluster
L312	Sig, Illum, Grd, White, Star, Parachute
M023	Charge, Demolition, Block, C-4, 1 1/2 lb

(12) Status of primary Land Lines of Communications (LOC) as of 31 July 1968.

(a) For the purpose of this report the following terms on condition of land LOC are defined.

1. Condition I: The route is capable of carrying up to class 50 loads (all division loads).

2. Condition II: Up to class 35 loads (the majority of logistical transport e.g. 5000 - gallon POL tanker).

3. Condition III: Up to class 16 loads (Armored Personnel Carriers and 2 1/2 ton trucks).

4. Condition IV: Can carry only light civilian traffic; therefore, it is open only to light reconnaissance vehicles.

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5 Condition V: Closed to all traffic.

(b) Route QL 1.

1 Cambodian Border (XT284244) to Co Dau Ha (XT382250), bridge blown at XT383250. Route condition V.

2 Co Dau Ha (XT382250) to Cu Chi (XT628126), lowest bridge capacity class 60. Route condition I.

3 Cu Chi (XT628126) to Saigon (XS793942), lowest bridge capacity class 60. Route condition I.

4 Saigon (XS793942) to Bien Hoa (XT990100), lowest bridge capacity class 30. Route condition III.

5 Bien Hoa (XT990100) to Xuan Loc (YT456090), lowest bridge capacity class 40. Route condition II.

6 Xuan Loc (YT456090) to II CTZ Boundary (ZT180014), lowest bridge capacity class 30. Route condition III.

(c) Route QL 4.

1 Route QL 1 (XS845914) to Ben Luc (XS618758), lowest bridge capacity class 50. Route condition I.

2 Ben Luc (XS618758) to III-IV CTZ Boundary (XS599600), lowest bridge capacity class 35. Route condition II.

(d) Route QL 13.

1 Route QL 1 (XS879971) to An Loc (XT755885), lowest bridge capacity class 30. Route condition III.

2 An Loc (XT755885) to Cambodian Border (XU683233), Route condition V.

(e) Route QL 14. Dong Xoai (YT079759) to II CTZ Boundary (YT588175), two bridges out at (YT302012) and (YT166820). Route condition V.

(f) Route QL 15.

1 Bien Hoa (YT002114) to Baria (YS380607), lowest bridge capacity class 60. Route condition I.

2 Baria (YS380607) to Vung Tau (YS274444), lowest bridge capacity class 30. Route condition IV.

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(g) Route QL 20. Route QL 1 (YT343101) to II CTZ Boundary (YT763-572), lowest bridge capacity class 30. Route condition III.

(h) Route LTL 16. Bien Hoa (YT002114) to Route LTL 1A (XT687373), lowest bridge capacity class 50. Route condition I.

(i) Route LTL 1A.

1 Dong Xaoi (YT079759) to Phuoc Vinh (XT970490), lowest bridge capacity class 40. Route condition II.

2 Phuoc Vinh (XT975491) to Route QL 13 (XT812140), lowest bridge capacity class 60. Route condition I.

(j) Route LTL 2. Route QL 1 (YT 437045) to Baria (YS380607), lowest bridge capacity class 24. Route condition III.

(k) Route LTL 5A. Saigon (XS816890) to Cau Noi Ferry (XS786568). Route condition V.

(l) Route LTL 23.

1 Baria (YS380607) to (YS628653), lowest bridge capacity class 40. Route condition II.

2 YS628653 to Ham Tan (ZX020830). Route condition V.

(m) Route LTL 9A and LTL 10. Saigon (XS790890) to Bao Trai (XT526-044), lowest bridge capacity class 30. Route condition III.

(n) Route LTL 26 and 239. Tay Ninh (XT259500) to Dau Tieng (XT490-469), lowest bridge capacity class 60. Route condition I.

(o) Route LTL 316. Saigon (YT072130) to Long Binh (YT060120), lowest bridge capacity class 60. Route condition I.

f. Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs/Civic Action.

(1) Significant Psychological Operations activities.

(a) The II FFORCEV Psychological Operations (PSYOP) effort in support of tactical operations increased significantly during this quarter. Although the number of sorties flown by US/FWMAF Army and Air Force aircraft in support of PSYOP remained constant (2,500), the aerial dissemination of leaflets increased from 221 million during the previous quarter to 359 million for this quarter. In addition, the number of aerial loudspeaker broadcasts increased from 1,700 hours last quarter to 2,100 hours this quarter.

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Continued emphasis is being placed on face-to face communications, updating of PSYOP material, production of better quality material and pretesting material prior to dissemination.

(b) A total of 565 Hoi Chanh were reported in III CTZ for this quarter. This is an increase of 217 over the previous quarter.

(2) Significant Civil Affairs/Civic Action Activities. Military Civic Action in the II FFORCEV area of operations continued at an accelerated rate with a record number of civic action projects completed during this quarter. The emphasis continued to be on improvement of Vietnamese living standards and enhancement of the image of US/FWMAF military units and GVN authorities in the III CTZ. To accomplish these objectives priority was given to health and sanitation, construction projects and commodity distribution. Civic action projects conducted by US/FWMAF units assigned to or under the operational control of II FFORCEV in III and IV CTZ during the reporting period continued to show the increased interest of US/FWMAF in Civic Action Program throughout the III CTZ.

g. Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS).

(1) Revolutionary Development.

(a) The 1968 Revolutionary Development (RD) program began to move during this reporting period. The TET Offensive had delayed implementation in most areas until the end of March. During April the teams were getting adjusted to their hamlets and from May through July the work was conducted more enthusiastically than ever before. This was sparked by the concern developed by the capabilities of the enemy shown during the TET and May offensives. Overall the RD program showed progress during this period. In Gia Dinh Province, serious disruptions occurred again in May due to the renewed offensives. Binh Duong and Hau Nghia Provinces also have suffered serious setbacks as a result of both offensives. The Phuoc Long program has not recovered from the attacks received during the first quarter. Elsewhere successes can be seen; a review altering the 1968 plan contributed much to this. After the first offensive, a review was conducted in which 67 hamlets were dropped and 46 hamlets were added to the program to fit the altered security picture. Concurrently a new concept of classification of hamlets and the tasks to be accomplished by the RD cadre was implemented as a result of Ministry of Revolutionary Development (MORD) Memorandum 003, dated 17 May 1968. This directive significantly altered the mission assigned to the RD cadre to focus on the elimination of Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI) and on the organization of the people. Another significant change in procedures and management established by this memorandum was the elimination of Division Tactical Area (DTA) responsibility for certification inspections of completed hamlets. This function is now carried out by the RD staff.

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(b) Currently work is underway in 140 hamlets with certification having been completed in 13. The 1968 program is a more ambitious undertaking as a result of MORD Memo 003. In changing hamlet classification all hamlets are now worked as Ap Doi Moi (Real New Life Hamlet) and all are to be worked under the same criteria. Before, many of the 1968 planned hamlets were Ap Binh Dinh (Pacification Hamlet) which had only two criteria. Consequently, many of them could be worked simultaneously with an adjacent Ap Doi Moi by one team. Under the new criteria it appears to be necessary to work each hamlet independently. Although the Ap Doi Moi previously scheduled for the 11 criteria have had their tasks greatly reduced, it remains to be seen whether the available teams can complete the revised criteria in all programmed hamlets. Most provinces maintain that it will be done.

(c) During the reporting period much difficulty was encountered in implementing the Outer Belt Hamlet (OBH) plan explained in the last report. Once III Corps Tactical Zone (III CTZ) began to work in RD again, the MORD funding for the plan was approved during the first week in June. American support for the plan has not yet been formally declared. This has caused some difficulty in providing the three-man cadre cells in some provinces. Some provinces have implemented the plan with existing RD Cadre and Regional Forces/Popular Forces (RF/PF) assets. It is anticipated that the question of support to this plan will be resolved at the Saigon level in the near future. In the meantime the implementation of the plan moves slowly ahead.

(d) An item of increasing concern has been the failure of some provinces to insure that the five-man stay-behind cadre cell and adequate RF or PF are maintained in hamlets that have been completed under the regular 1967 and 1968 RD plans. This is being given close advisory attention and it is felt the situation will improve.

(e) In summary it can be said that the pacification program is moving ahead in spite of the VC offensives and that much will be accomplished in 1968. At the same time it is clear that no pacification program can prepare a hamlet to withstand the incursion of large enemy forces. The only adequate protection from such incursions is the application of adequate military force to deny the enemy this access.

### (2) National Police.

(a) Overall strength of the National Police, including National Police Field Force (NPFF), during May-July remained fairly constant, with a total of 12,914 (1,954 NPFF) personnel, assigned to the various police departments within III CTZ. One of the most significant developments that occurred during this reporting period was the incorporation of Gia Dinh NP into the III CTZ National Police Directorate (NPD). Formal transition took place on 31 July. Prior to that time Gia Dinh was an integral part

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of the Saigon Metropolitan Police Directorate. One of the most important changes to occur in the operations of the National Police involved the 10 June decree of the Prime Minister, which clearly stated that the National Police are to be under the operational control of the Province Chiefs. One of the prime targets of the enemy terrorist campaign has been the National Police. During the May-July period there were 48 NP killed and 87 wounded in III CTZ. Despite the large number of incidents targeted against the National Police, only one of the command personnel suffered injury. This occurred on 28 June when the Chief of Police in Phuoc Long Province was wounded as a result of an enemy mortar attack on the Provincial National Police Headquarters. The Public Safety Division (PSD) advisory effort did not fare so well. Mr. Michael Murphy was killed by the enemy in Hau Nghia Province on 22 May and two advisors were wounded in Gia Dinh Province three days later.

(b) The staffing pattern for PSD personnel in III CTZ calls for one Assistant Provincial Advisor/Public Safety (APA/PS) in each of the 11 provinces and the autonomous city of Vung Tau. In addition a second APA/PS is authorized in four provinces (Long An, Hau Nghia, Binh Duong and Bien Hoa). Gia Dinh is authorized three APA/PS. NPFF Advisors are authorized for each province, within the National Priority Area, which has or is scheduled to have NPFF units. These 27 slots are supported at GORDS III CTZ Headquarters by a staff of four, including the III CTZ Senior Advisor and the Senior Corrections and Detention (C&D) Advisor. In addition to these civilian slots the JTD calls for the assignment of one US military and a senior non-commissioned officer. As of 31 July 1968 the officer slot and seven civilian slots were vacant.

(c) The National Police Resource Control Program is intended to deny, as far as possible, critical resources including manpower, to the enemy. Within III CTZ, as of 31 July 1968, there were a total of 103 fixed land checkpoints, 20 marine fixed checkpoints and three combined land/marine checkpoints. In addition to the fixed checkpoints there were 49 mobile teams operating. Many of these teams were joint efforts, including US Military Police and ARVN Quan Canh as well as National Police. During the second quarter of 1968 checkpoint operations accounted for the apprehension or detention of 45 deserters, 1,281 draft evaders, 74 enemy, 109 Viet Cong Suspects, 630 illegal residents and 420 other offenders. These operations also resulted in the seizure of 64,462 kilograms of rice and paddy, 221 kilograms of salt, plus almost 6,843 units of foodstuffs and other critical items. It is anticipated that all US military units will be tasked to provide support, including manpower, so that a much greater mobile effort, particularly in the areas adjacent to VC controlled areas, can be undertaken. With this increase in mobility it is anticipated that there will be a corresponding decrease in fixed facilities.

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(d) There has been no major improvement in the area of detention camps. This is not because of lack of advisory effort; potential sites have been inspected and in Binh Tuy a camp will be built in Ham Tan as soon as construction commodities arrive on the scene. Generally speaking the various provincial correctional institutions in III CTZ are in fairly good shape. Some are overcrowded but measures are being taken to relieve congested conditions. The most difficult situation is in Hau Nghia Province where there is no authorized correctional center, yet the National Police are charged by the Province Chief with the maintenance of over 300 inmates in an area that should only have 95 at the most. Advisory pressure is being exerted to help alleviate this situation.

(e) In early January the 3rd National Police Field Force was activated as a part of the Zone III National Police Directorate. Unfortunately this unit has not been under the operational control of the III CTZ National Police since its activation, having been active in the Saigon area since the start of the TET Offensive. During May when the second offensive started in Saigon three NPFF companies were transferred to Saigon, the 301st and 310th from Bien Hoa, and the 305th Company from Phuoc Tuy. The two companies from Bien Hoa are still deployed in Saigon but the 305th Company was moved to Vung Tau. It is not known when NPFF Companies 301 and 310 will return.

(f) The primary mission of the NPFF is the elimination of the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI). Although the NPFF have been misused in some areas this situation is rapidly improving, and a more definite awareness of proper deployment to eliminate the VCI is apparent...

(g) On 16-17 July the III CTZ chiefs of police and their American advisors conducted a joint seminar in Vung Tau. The seminar concentrated on six main areas: Special Police support of the PHOENIX Program, NPFF activities and proper deployment, improving Resource Control activities, National Police training programs, National police logistics and files, records and reports. The principal speaker at the conference was the new Director General National Police (DGNP), Colonel Hai.

(h) A major Public Safety Division-sponsored effort is the new National Identity Card Program. Beginning about 1 October 1968, the CVN will launch a program of issuing new identity cards. This will involve the registration, photographing and fingerprinting of all legal residents 15 years of age or older. Mobile identification card teams will be operating in each province and Vung Tau in an effort to expedite the program; it is expected to be completed within a period of three years.

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## (3) Refugee Program.

(a) TET Recovery Program. The TET Recovery Program accelerated very markedly during the past three months and was drawing near its end by the latter part of July. Gia Dinh Province, which still owed payments to some 4,000 families, was the only III CTZ province which did not have an essentially completed program. A total of 22,058 TET victim families received some VN\$165 million in relief and reconstruction allowances; 162,980 sheets of roofing and 164,670 bags of cement were issued, and VN\$6,100,000 was paid out in death and injury benefits to some 2,493 individuals and families. It is estimated that 80 per cent or more of these payments were made since 1 May, illustrating GVN's considerable capability for implementing large scale relief and recovery operations, once administrative and organizational problems are gotten out of the way.

(b) Special Refugee Census. At the request of ACoFS, CORDS, a survey was initiated in all provinces in June to determine the present number of refugees in camps, their general status, particularly with respect to employment, and the present condition of the refugee centers. The results of the initial survey were reported to Saigon on a special census report card and the data has been computerized. Provinces are presently evaluating and refining the initial data, a process which will take several more weeks. The object of this survey is to identify and isolate the specific problems at each center which inhibit the completion of refugee resettlement programs, and to aid in the establishment of detailed work plans for each refugee group and center. This development represents the first real attempt at systematic resettlement program planning and management. As such, this is an important step forward in the evolution of the refugee program. A major corollary benefit of this approach will be the identification and elimination of groups of refugees and certain refugee centers carried in an active status when the resettlement process has already been completed. Through this step will come a vast improvement in statistical reporting, whose poor quality has made planning virtually impossible in the past, and a much clearer focus on actual refugee problems. One further beneficial outgrowth will be the establishment of much clearer criteria than have existed previously, as to when refugees are to be considered as resettled, and therefore, as having lost refugee status.

(c) Second Offensive. Some 60,000 people were made homeless during the May attacks, with about 80 per cent of this total recorded in Gia Dinh Province. The other affected provinces were Tay Ninh, Hau Nghia and Binh Duong. Victims of the second offensive in Gia Dinh were declared to be eligible for the same type of assistance, including reconstruction assistance, as had been given TET victims, but the GVN has not extended eligibility for all benefits to the more than 1,000 affected families in the other three provinces. About 75 per cent of the second offensive

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victims in Gia Dinh Province have already received GVN assistance and have returned to their home area where they are rebuilding their houses. Most of the homeless families in the other provinces are still awaiting a favorable GVN decision on granting reconstruction assistance to them.

(d) Population Relocation. During the period 22-4 July, GVN authorities, assisted by elements of the US 1st Infantry Division, relocated 140 families from Bo La hamlet, Binh Long Province, to an area some 20 kilometers to the north, within the same district. Notable features of this movement were the degree of advance planning, which permitted smooth execution of the operation, the availability of sufficient transport to remove all personal possessions including draft animals and livestock, which will greatly reduce the evacuees' burden and degree of dependence, and the strong support received from province authorities and the Ministry of Health, Social Welfare and Relief (MHSWR), which resulted in the assignment of an RD Cadre to head a MHSWR team to the relocation site, as well as the prepositioning of adequate food stocks, water, temporary shelters, and the advance authorization of necessary funds. As a result of the care which was devoted to the operation, as exemplified by the personal visit of the Minister of Health to the relocation site, the customary adverse consequences of relocation were greatly reduced, and the evacuees were able to begin construction of their permanent residences within the first week after their arrival at the new site.

(4) Chieu Hoi.

(a) During the period of 1 May through 31 July 1968, there were two major enemy attacks on Chieu Hoi centers. One at Hoi Chanh was abducted and one assassinated.

1 On 22 May, the Tay Ninh Chieu Hoi center was attacked by an estimated two enemy platoons, supported by rockets and mortars. Buildings at the center were heavily damaged, but the attack was repelled by the center Armed Propaganda Company, one member of which was killed.

2 On 22 June, there was a major attack on the Chieu Hoi hamlet in Phuoc Tuy. The enemy penetrated the hamlet and killed 10 persons; three Armed Propaganda Team (APT) members, two Hoi Chanh, two ARVN soldiers and three visitors. In addition the enemy looted the houses, taking radios, clothing, food and other items. Enemy soldiers told the captives that they would return in the future and kill them if they remained in the hamlet.

(b) There were 568 rallies during this reporting period, an increase of 220 over the previous period. On 19 June, the largest group ever to rally at one time, 148 detainees, rallied in the Go Vap area of Gia Dinh. Twenty-seven of them were seriously wounded. A total of 121 of these rallies were eventually classified as Hoi Chanh.

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(c) Intelligence information furnished by Hoi Chanh was not always exploited by operational forces. Three instances of this lack of exploitation have been noted during the reporting period. In all these cases the information collected from the Hoi Chanh was disseminated to appropriate agencies and commands.

(d) Due to the new mobilization decree by GVN the Chieu Hoi program has lost a number of members of the provincial staffs. The loss of staff personnel has had a deleterious effect on operations of the Armed Propaganda Companies. The members, of necessity, have been used to fill the void left by the departing staff resulting in fewer psychological operations by the Armed Propaganda Teams. An effort is under way to get the Chieu Hoi Service, where possible, to employ handicapped veterans and females to fill staff positions.

(5) New Life Development (NLD).

(a) General.

1 By 1 May, most pressing emergency demands created by the TET Offensive had been met and a gradual shift from stop-gap measures to normal program activities had begun. Most NLD programs had lost some ground as the result of the TET attack, although by the end of July, pre-TET levels had largely been regained, and, in some instances surpassed. Notable exceptions were programs relating to industry and public administration.

2 Unlike the TET offensive which had brought pacification efforts almost to a halt, the May offensive slowed, but did not significantly disrupt, the broad range of activities encompassed by NLD. The war aggravated the basic problems which have plagued the various programs for some time, but few of the difficulties were directly attributable to that cause. All programs continued to suffer from shortages of key personnel due to increased drafting of personnel into the military service. Additional problems which the recent crisis brought into focus and which require remedial measures include attitudes and institutions too inflexible to cope simultaneously with the complex requirements of a modern society and an intensified war effort, inadequate capabilities in the fields of transportation, communication and capital management, and excessive government involvement in what should be private economic activities, with a concomitant failure to provide sufficient incentive to private entrepreneurs.

(b) Economics.

1 By May, commercial traffic moved freely on most major lines of communication (LOC) in III CTZ and the impact of the TET Offensive on market condition had largely subsided. Agricultural output had regained,

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and in some instances surpassed, pre-T&T levels. Prices of consumer goods, which had risen sharply in the wake of the T&T attacks, had regressed normal levels. Only in the outlying areas, which still must be supplied almost exclusively by air, did high price levels persist.

2 In the industrial sphere, little evidence of recovery is, as yet, discernible. The physical damage to industrial and commercial enterprises during the T&T attack is estimated at US\$25 to 30 million. The economic loss attributable to the prolonged disruption of productive activity is difficult to establish precisely, but it is considerable and it continues to mount as large segments of the economy remain stagnant. While damage to industrial and commercial installations from the May offensive was small as compared to that of the T&T assault, its psychological impact in driving home the enemy's ability to strike at will has delayed the resumption of normal activities and perpetuated a wait-and-see attitude which has prevailed in commercial and industrial circles since T&T. Most of the large plants in the Gia Dinh/Bien Hoa area are operating at a fraction of their capacity, and many remain closed. By contrast, the small family-type enterprises scattered throughout the III CTZ and which cannot afford to remain idle, have for the most part resumed production.

3 Little capital investment has taken place in new plants, equipment, or in the expansion or replacement of existing facilities anywhere in III CTZ. Shortages of funds undoubtedly played a role although indications are that considerable savings are being withheld from investment. Liquidity has doubled annually during recent years and no utilization on a significant scale of the accumulated funds can be discerned. The root of the problem seems to lie with the reluctance of the business community to invest its resources in the face of the prevailing uncertainty. The GVN has done little to create a climate conducive to private investment and economic growth; nor has it produced adequate incentives for the private sector to participate in the task of economic development which must be attained to give validity to promises of a better life. GVN lethargy in the matter of assistance to industrial and commercial victims of the enemy attacks has contributed substantially to the erosion of business confidence. Much of the impact and the psychological value of any assistance that might come forth now has been fortified by this earlier failure to act. It remains to be seen whether the War Risk Insurance scheme and certain recovery loan arrangements now being worked out by the GVN will be effective in restoring business confidence sufficiently to reverse this unfavorable trend.

### (c) Agriculture.

1 The most significant progress was recorded in the agricultural field where activities centered on the production program for IR-8 rice. This is a variety with a shorter growing cycle and a considerably higher yield than the traditional strains of rice. The success of this program was dependent upon an adequate and timely support of all necessary inputs

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(seed, fertilizer and insecticides) as well as technical assistance aimed at initiating changes in long-standing cultural practices. Efforts have been focused on the moves necessary to make the new program a success. Lack of success in this pilot project could seriously delay the introduction of the IR-8 rice variety on a significant scale.

2 The Vo Dat experimental IR-8 rice production project was developed against overwhelming odds. The reported volume of rice harvested in Vo Dat suggests a yield of about 2.5 tons per hectare as compared to 1.6 tons for the traditional varieties. Taking into account, however, the considerable quantities believed to have been withheld by farmers, the yield actually attained would come close to the five to six tons per hectare which had been anticipated. Under the impact of success at Vo Dat, the 1968 rice program showed signs of moving well ahead of planned goals. A variety of problems connected with the transportation and distribution of seeds and other inputs forced farmers unable to obtain supplies before the onset of the rainy season to revert to the traditional varieties of rice. As a result, actual plantings fell short of commitments, and the Corps-wide goal of between 10,000 and 11,000 hectares was met only to the extent of some 60 per cent.

3 In the high priority field of protein production, feed supply and distribution were areas of major concern which must be improved before significant and lasting progress in hog and poultry production can be made. Emphasis on animal and poultry sanitation as well as disease prevention to minimize losses also became the focus of advisory attention during this period.

### (d) Engineering.

1 Increased military activities over the past six months took a heavy toll of the road network in III CTZ. Highways deteriorated rapidly under the increased movement of heavy equipment and material, and bridges vital to communications were destroyed by enemy action. The regional and provincial GVN Public Works staffs, plagued by shortages of equipment and personnel, were unable to cope with these additional demands. Because of the vital importance of lines of communication to military and pacification aims, responsibility for national and inter-provincial roads has been assumed by Military Assistance Command Vietnam, Deputy Commander, and the only really meaningful work in the area of roads and bridges has been carried out by the US military or under its control.

2 Water and electric power deficiencies continued in III CTZ electrification projects, which were generally confined to small hamlet level installation and were insignificant in the face of rapidly rising demand throughout the area. The number of well drilling rigs was reduced from eight to six, owing primarily to the unavailability of qualified operating personnel.

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(e) Public Administration. The most significant development in the field of public administration was the effective dissolution, in May of the officers of government delegate and deputy government delegate. By action of the central government, the Commanding General of III Corps who also served as Government Delegate, ceased to exercise responsibility for coordinating and controlling the civil activities of the province chiefs. This move represented a major shift of control and coordination at regional level to direct control from central government level. However, because of the provisions of the previously issued Circular 001, the sources of control in Saigon were diffused and not clear as viewed from the provinces. The total effect of the dissolution of the offices of Government Delegate and Deputy Government Delegate was a weakening of command and administrative effectiveness in all provinces. Following as it did in the wake of the disruption caused by the TET offensive, this move to change basic command and coordination relationships was undertaken at a time when the greatest possible degree of stability and clearly defined leadership was urgently required.

## (f) Education.

1 The TET attack did not significantly delay the re-opening of schools in III CTZ. The second Viet Cong attack in May produced only localized effects which were most serious in Gia Dinh Province. There, the shortages of school facilities were increased by the closing of all schools in the province capital for a prolonged period of time. In many instances, the school buildings served as temporary shelters for refugees for which other arrangements needed to be made before the schools could be opened.

2 Some headway was made in ameliorating long standing shortages of classrooms and teachers, although actual performance generally fell short of goals. Only slightly more than 11 per cent of the 625 hamlet classrooms approved by the MORD for 1968 have been completed to date, and an additional 31 per cent are currently under construction. In the field of teacher training, less than one-half of the some 700 hamlet teachers approved by the MORD had actually completed training, although this entire training program was scheduled for completion before the beginning of the new school year in August. Shortages of secondary school teachers, whose training requires a longer period of time, continue with little relief in sight unless current efforts toward a comprehensive in-place mobilization scheme show a significant measure of success.

## (g) Logistics.

1 The logistics network in III CTZ coped successfully with the extraordinary demands for the supply and movement of commodities generated by the successive enemy attacks and subsequent intensification of military activities. Commodity levels remained generally adequate and no significant shortages developed anywhere in this Corps area despite the fact that

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trucking contractors, reluctant to risk their vehicles on unsafe roads, have not moved commodities with any degree of regularity.

2 The construction program for province and district warehouses and for maintenance shops moved ahead slowly. Of the 25 warehouses scheduled for 1968, 11 have been started and four are completed. None of the maintenance shops can actually be placed into operation before plumbing and electric materials are supplied by the US Agency for International Development (USAID), Saigon.

(h) Youth.

1 Only recently has the GVN begun to give recognition to the importance of the nation's youth in the nation-building process and provided administrative and funding support for the development of programs specifically aimed at youth. Illustrative of this increase in emphasis has been the incorporation of the Directorate of Youth into the Ministry of Education (MOE), a move designed to bring about better coordination and cooperation in this important and largely neglected area. The development of meaningful programs for the youth of this country is a time-consuming process, and though considerable headway has been made during recent months in laying the groundwork for future activities, few, if any, such programs have actually become operational.

(6) PHOENIX/PHUNG HOANG Program.

(a) During the period from 1 May through 31 July 1968, the PHOENIX/PHUNG HOANG Program continued to make progress, but there were few significant operational changes. The number of District Intelligence and Operations Coordinating Centers (DIOCC) constructed and staffed by Vietnamese remained unchanged at 51. The number of DIOCC having an assigned US advisor fluctuated during the period, reaching a peak of 48, with two advisors assigned to DIOCC in several critical areas. The number of DIOCC with US advisors currently stands at 44 as ten advisors were reassigned to the Saigon metropolitan area as PHOENIX Police Precinct Advisors.

(b) During the reporting period over 1,100 members of the VUI were recorded as killed, apprehended, or rallied, compared with fewer than 500 during the preceding quarter. This increase was due in part to an improved accounting system for consolidating and recording VUI eliminations by all US and GVN agencies involved, and to a limited extent, to increased effectiveness of the attack on the infrastructure. Despite the statistical increase in eliminations, the DIOCC in general continue to be only marginally effective with regard to anti-infrastructure operations. This is due primarily to long-standing GVN indifference toward the program, and the lack of training in the necessary techniques among GVN district personnel.

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(c) A significant step was taken in the solution of the first of these problems with the signing on 1 July of Presidential Decree No. 280-a/TT/SL, effectively establishing the PHUNG HOANG Program for the first time, by defining specific responsibilities at each echelon. During the month of July there was considerable activity among GVN officials at all levels as preliminary steps were taken to implement the decree.

(d) The problem of lack of training among DIOCC personnel has also received high priority. A Regional Police Special Branch (PSB) School is now operating in Bien Hoa to provide a one-month course in investigative and intelligence techniques, and several provinces have established two-week training courses for PSB personnel who have not yet attended the Region school. In addition, the PHOENIX Mobile Training Team became operational during the reporting period, providing a one-day training session in each local DIOCC, covering interrogations, report writing, investigative methods, clerical functions, and operational techniques. The training team, composed of one American and several Vietnamese, has now visited more than 20 DIOCC in five provinces.

### (7) Regional Force/Popular Force (RF/PF).

(a) During this reporting period, each US Division in III Corps Tactical Zone conducted search, cordon and search, and reconnaissance in force operations with the assistance of RF/PF units. In some instances these operations were conducted jointly. In other instances RF or PF units or members of these units were integrated into US units. An example of this is a PF platoon that was assigned to a US company for a specific operation. With few exceptions, these joint operations were more successful in locating enemy personnel and equipment than the unilateral ones. In fact, an element of the 1st Infantry Division reported having made contact/findings on 25 percent of all unilateral operations while making contact/findings on 50 percent of all joint operations during the period 13-21 July 1968. On 11 May the 198 RF Company conducted a joint operation with the 4/9 Infantry Battalion, 25th US Division. The elements air assaulted in Tan Binh District (vic XS-680945) and the operation lasted for two days. Friendly units had several contacts throughout the first day. The heaviest contact occurred at 1700 hours and continued for two hours. During the day, five air-strikes were conducted and three light fire teams were used. Artillery also was employed continuously. The operation terminated at 1200 hours on 12 May with the following results: 80 enemy killed and 13 RPG rounds, 10 RPG launchers and 10 rifles captured. Thirty of the enemy were credited to the 198 RF Company. RF casualties consisted of three wounded. Binh Tuy Province conducted a joint operation with Binh Thuan Province (II CTZ) from 2 to 5 June. The results were minor in casualties inflicted on the enemy but the results of this operation are still being felt. Units involved were the 513th and 515th RF Companies and PHU force of 20 men

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from Binh Tuy Province. Binh Thuan, a II Corps Province, had two RF companies and two companies of the US 3/506 Infantry, 101st Air Cavalry Division. Supporting units were US air elements from both corps, a US Navy destroyer and helicopter support from the 18th Infantry Division (ARVN). This operation was conducted along the Binh Tuy/Binh Thuan boundary. Coordination was extremely good. Many documents with excellent intelligence information were found. Seven detainees and 26 Hoi Chanhs were brought in as a direct result of this operation.

## h. Communication.

(1) Significant improvements to command and control communications have been accomplished during the period ending 31 July 1968. Both the means and methods of communications have been increased to provide greater flexibility and response in direct support of command operations.

(2) On 5 May 68, Hurricane Forward (Task Force Hay) was established to provide the required coordination and direction of tactical units operating in Capital Military District (CMD). Personnel of the II FFORCEV Signal Section and a contingent of enlisted men with equipment from the 53d Signal Battalion (Corps) were provided to support the requirement for communications. The communications plan was developed to provide common user and sole user service in the Saigon area as well as to II FFORCEV Tactical Operations Center (TOC). The primary means of contact with the OPOON units was FM radio. Generally, communications for the task force was reliable and provided means for all operational requirements. No significant breakdowns were encountered throughout the entire period of operation. Activities concerning Task Force Hay and operations within CMD area terminated on 16 May 68. Communications equipment to support the task force along with one officer and eight enlisted men remained behind to insure communications would be available in the event of additional enemy activity.

(3) On 4 June 68, Hurricane Forward was again activated. To facilitate operations, an organization designated as Capital Military Assistance Command (CMAC) was organized. The signal personnel and equipment located at CMD since 5 May 68 were used to initially support the newly formed headquarters. As the tactical requirements increased additional personnel and equipment from the II FFORCEV Signal Section and the 53d Signal Battalion were dispatched to CMAC. A signal section and a signal detachment were organized for CMAC with personnel and equipment arriving from sources within country. II FFORCEV personnel and certain communications equipment are being phased out and the CMAC Signal Detachment is taking over operations of all systems and radio nets.

(4) During this period all OPOON units were made more aware of the Address Indicating Group (AIG) program. All OPOON units were queried concerning their need and/or use of AIG. A study was made of all OPOON units.

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teletype message traffic and recommendations were made to each OPCON unit concerning suggested AIG for their own use. Requests were then directed to OPCON units asking them to state which AIG they wanted so that a consolidated II FFORCEV regulation listing authorized AIG for all OPCON units of II FFORCEV could be published. As a result of this program, II FFORCEV Regulation 105-1 was published in June authorizing many OPCON units to originate messages addressed to an AIG.

(5) Communications facilities were planned and provided for the II FFORCEV ALTERNATE TOC. This ALTERNATE TOC, located in the III Corps Compound, Bien Hoa, became operational in July. Communications installed included Teletype (TTY), FM Radio, HF Radio, and HF RPT, MACV and USARV Emergency Action Console (EAC) service, Bien Hoa Air Force Dial Control Office (DXO) phone lines, an internal Manual Telephone Exchange (MTC-1), and access to the II FFORCEV Main TOC via VHF and Cable. In addition communications facilities for the new II FFORCEV Main TOC now under construction were planned. Coordination with the Engineers for cable entrances and ducts has been made during this period.

(6) Progress on laying underground tactical cable continued. The 100 pair cable from Hurricane Patch to Hallmark was accepted in May and the 100 pair cable from Hurricane Patch to 303ER Battalion in July. Currently installed but not operational is the 100 pair cable from Hurricane Patch to the units to the north of Plantation: 199th Infantry Brigade, 303d Radio Research Battalion, 12th Aviation Group and the 79th Engineer Group.

(7) In June the outover from the old AN/TTC-7 switchboard to the new AN/TTC-28 switchboard was made. The AN/TTC-28 provides greater compatibility with the AN/TTC-28 dial equipment already in operation. Due to the fact the AN/TTC-28 switchboard is much newer, operator supervision has also improved.

(8) Two major permanent changes in communications to subordinate units were made. A TRC-24 system to the new Capital Military Assistance Command, Saigon, was established in May. The TRC-24 system to Dong Tam was rechanneled on 20-21 July 1968 to support the 9th Infantry Division move in mid-July to that area. Associated Army Area circuits to these areas were also installed.

(9) A Headquarters, II FFORCEV Limited Distribution Command and Staff Special SOI was created for use by the command and staff during visits to tactical units. This SOI includes all tactical FM command nets of divisions, brigades/regiments and battalions/squadrons units within II FFORCEV plus the III CTZ Advisory nets and III CTZ Special Forces Units.

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1. Information.

(1) The II FFORCEV Information Office continued publication of the monthly Hurricane magazine, and obtained fund approval to increase its circulation from 18,000 to 36,000 copies per month. This number provides one copy for each four persons in the command.

(2) The radio broadcast section of this office was revitalized in June and production of home town tapes rose significantly. In July, 183 tapes were released as compared to 99 in June. The total for the first five months of the calendar year was only 145. In addition, news and feature releases were made to several outlets each week.

(3) Extensive coverage of the CORDS story continued as did reporting of joint US-ARVN and US-RF/PF operations, supplementing the regular program of coverage of American military activities.

j. Inspector General. During the reporting period, the Inspector General, Headquarters, II FFORCEV conducted inspections of six assigned and/or attached units, and processed 126 individual complaints, 65 of which were justified, 25 were unjustified, and 36 were requests for assistance.

k. Staff Judge Advocate.

(1) During the reporting period personnel of the Staff Judge Advocate's Section visited the following units in the field to (1) assist and advise the commander and his key personnel in the proper administration of military justice and Article 15; (2) to inform the commander and his key personnel as to the proper method of submitting claims for personal property damaged or lost as a result of hostile action, and (3) to render legal assistance services to all personnel requiring such assistance:

Headquarters, 23d Artillery Group

Headquarters, 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery

Headquarters, 2d Battalion, 13th Artillery

Headquarters, 2d Battalion, 32d Artillery

Headquarters, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

Headquarters, 199th Infantry Brigade

Elements of 53d Signal Battalion on Hill 637

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(2) The Staff Judge Advocate classified a number of detainees as civil defendants or prisoners of war.

(3) There were five general courts-martial conducted for such offenses as involuntary manslaughter, AWOL, escape from confinement, possession of marijuana, worthless checks, disrespect to an officer and assault on an officer.

(4) During the reporting period the Staff Judge Advocate office continued to experience a shortage of personnel. Due to a particularly heavy case load, it became necessary to borrow an attorney from another staff section and to utilize the Legal Administrative Officer, who happened to be an attorney, as a Legal Assistance Officer rather than in his assigned position.

(5) During the reporting period the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate received frequent requests from the Office of the Deputy for CORDS, II FFORCEV, for legal support. These matters included assistance in the drafting of correspondence, orders, and memoranda, assistance in negotiations with USARV and MACV on questions dealing with compensation for private property occupied by elements of II FFORCEV and its OPCON units. Additionally it was found desirable to coordinate with elements of DEPCORDS on questions of classification of detainees to obtain evidence pertaining to such cases and to insure that within the limits of international law all classifications were made in the manner most likely to advance the long term interests of the United States and to avoid conflict with appropriate agencies of the RVN.

(6) The Office of the Staff Judge Advocate also provided considerable day to day legal advice to units and personnel of the III Corps Advisory Team, since they also work for the Commanding General, II FFORCEV, despite the fact that they are assigned to MACV.

(7) During the reporting period the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate devoted considerable time and effort to what would be normal post, camp or station functions - i.e. legal advice to and about non-appropriated fund maintenance of facilities, and concessions.

(8) On 20 June 1968 this Headquarters was given general court-martial jurisdiction over the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. Since that date this office has provided a weekly visit by an officer of this section to Blackhorse, the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment base camp, to provide legal support for commanders and a legal assistance program for all personnel stationed at Blackhorse. About half the personnel at Blackhorse are not from II FFORCEV units but in the absence of other readily available legal support the legal assistance program is also open to them.

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(9) On 25 July 1968 this headquarters was given general court-martial jurisdiction over the 6th Battalion, 15th Artillery, which on that date became part of the 23d Artillery Group.

(10) During the period the DEPCORDS, III CTZ, received two newly arrived officers with civil affairs training who were also attorneys, although not members of the Judge Advocate General's Corps. By coordination with DEPCORDS, III CTZ, the Staff Judge Advocate will continue to provide legal policy guidance and legal support but one or both of these officers will be used, as required, for detailed legal work under the professional guidance of the Staff Judge Advocate, II FFORCEV. This has relieved the Staff Judge Advocate of several time consuming trips to Headquarters, MACV in connection with detailed investigation and work on certain real estate problems.

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### 2. (C) Section 2. Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations.

a. Personnel. None.

b. Operations.

#### (1) Interdiction of Sampan Traffic.

(a) OBSERVATION. Sampan traffic during hours of darkness can be best controlled by combining detection assets with a ready reaction capability such as Firefly teams to locate and destroy targets rapidly.

(b) EVALUATION. This headquarters recently placed increased emphasis upon the use of Firefly aircraft to interdict night sampan movement in the extensive canal and waterway system of southern Hau Nghia and northwestern Long An Province. Firefly is a UH-1D aircraft equipped with a bank of seven aircraft landing lights and a .50 caliber machinegun. It is supported by a light fire team usually made up of two UH-1C aircraft. The firefly aircraft patrols waterways and sides of canals at an altitude of 250-500 feet and either engages targets with its own .50 caliber machinegun or directs the fire of the light fire team. Clearances are obtained as late as possible so that the enemy intelligence net does not have time to react and issue warnings. Extensive use is made of RED HAZE and SLAR readings in selecting target areas. The three Firefly teams employed nightly by this headquarters during the month of July destroyed 276 sampans. This made a significant contribution to the objective of preventing the mounting of another attack on Saigon during this period.

#### (2) Joint-US-RF/FF Operations.

(a) OBSERVATION. Joint operations, participated in by US and RF/FF units, have proved advantageous to both organizations.

(b) EVALUATION. US units have found that RF/FF personnel provide valuable assistance, especially in areas unfamiliar to US forces because of their knowledge of local customs, indigenous personnel, and the terrain. It was also found that the RF/FF could obtain information from the local inhabitants which US personnel could not get even through an interpreter. US forces on the other hand can provide greater firepower and support than is normally available to RF/FF units working alone. Noteworthy is the fact that RF/FF units appeared more aggressive and confident when participating in joint operations. Generally, as well, district officials and advisors were cooperative and receptive to joint operations. In many cases, combined search operations were conducted in response to intelligence obtained through GVN channels. The record speaks for itself. Search type operations and operations in and around populated areas have proved more effective when RF/FF are used jointly with US forces, or for that matter, any Free World Military Force.

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(c) RECOMMENDATION. In view of the great success that joint operations achieved during the period 1 May - 31 July, it is strongly recommended that all headquarters encourage their units to use RF/PF units to assist them in combat operations.

## (3) Employment of Long Range Patrols for Landing Zone Security.

(a) OBSERVATION. Long Range Patrol insertions do not utilize the landing zone preparation associated with large airmobile assaults. Even when using sections of extremely large landing zones, long range patrols seldom encounter more than small enemy landing zone watches, and usually receive only slight fire when such elements are present.

(b) EVALUATION. In large airmobile assaults a preparation by artillery and tactical air of considerable magnitude is often used in the area of the proposed landing. In many cases after such a barrage the enemy is able to be present in large concentrations at the landing zone when the assault commences. This is due to the fact that artillery and tactical air must be lifted prior to the insertion to allow the helicopters to approach the proposed landing zone. This period allows the enemy to mass his forces on the periphery of the preparation and to move onto the landing zone when the preparation is lifted. The preparation has compromised the proposed landing zone and the enemy has only to wait for the barrage to lift to move into position on the landing zone. Patrol insertions without preparations do not compromise the landing zone or indicate to the enemy the proposed point of insertion.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. To avoid compromise of large airmobile assault insertions while still enabling the elements to insert safely, it is recommended that long range patrols be inserted at least three to four days prior to the planned assaults of larger units to monitor enemy coverage of possible landing zones. In this manner, long range patrols can act as pathfinders and keep commanders informed of the enemy situation in the vicinity of the landing zones up to the time of insertion without giving away the intention to use the areas.

## (4) Enemy Lines of Communication and Resupply Capabilities in the III CTZ.

(a) OBSERVATION. The enemy faced in the III CTZ is dependent upon heavy weapons and upon resupply of large quantities of material requiring extensive vehicular and barge convoys.

(b) EVALUATION. With the increased use of heavy armament by enemy forces in the past months, particularly the use of RPG and heavy rockets, major attention has been given to locating caches of these weapons and interdicting their lines of supply. The importance of waterways in resupply of combat forces has become apparent. Waterways are used by the enemy more and more for the movement of supplies than for the movement of

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personnel. After the TET Offensive an estimated 60 percent of the infiltration groups sent into III CTZ to replace losses came through the very difficult jungle highlands of the Phuoc Long Saddle and another 35 percent through War Zone C, but only five percent through Ba Thu area in Hau Nghia Province with its extensive canal network. During this same period the major portion of the enemy logistical resupply was known to have come through the Ba Thu area. Enemy caches of weapons and equipment are continually found along waterways and are frequently sited where they can only be approached by boat. The large number of known VC communications-liaison stations detected along waterways throughout III CTZ indicates the great importance placed on water routes by the VC. Heavy reliance is placed upon the cover provided by trees and vegetation growing along canals and streams for concealment during daylight hours, with most movement restricted to the hours of darkness.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. None.

(5) Traffic Control.

(a) OBSERVATION. On 30 June, the Ben Luc Bridge, (XS617758) was partially destroyed as a result of enemy action. With no available alternate routes in the region, traffic quickly backed up five to seven miles on both approaches to the bridges.

(b) EVALUATION. Headquarters, II FFOCEV dispatched a message to O-CON units restricting traffic to combat essential vehicles and established time limitations for military convoys. Difficulty quickly developed with control of the tremendous influx of civilian trucks and busses. Additional problems were recognized in applying traffic priorities to US/VN convoys and Vietnamese cargo trucks carrying perishable produce. A need was seen for centralized management of the traffic control operations at the site. The Commander, 50th ARVN Regiment assumed overall operational control for coordinating traffic and security. The 92d Military Police Battalion retained primary US traffic control responsibility with support of 9th Infantry Division Military Police. The centralized control resulted in immediate improvement of the operation, and traffic flow was expedited. The necessity for the immediate establishment of a combined central operation is essential to fix responsibilities and coordinate joint operations of this nature. Responsible traffic priorities must be quickly determined and applied by the combined efforts of US military Police, Quan Canh and VN National Police. As a follow-up, careful monitoring of an on-site traffic count permits evaluation of control procedures and early identification of problem areas.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. None.

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(c) RECOMMENDATION. None.

(6) AN/GRC-10 Directional Antennas.

(a) OBSERVATION. AN/GRC-10 Directional Antennas were used to extend the effective range of the secure mode AN/VRC-12 series radios.

(b) EVALUATION. The 9th Infantry Division moved its headquarters to Dong Tam during the month of July 1968. This move presented a communications problem because Dong Tam is located approximately 60 miles from Headquarters, II FFORCEV. This distance is beyond the maximum effective range of the standard equipment associated with the AN/VRC-12 series radio and line-of-sight criteria are not met. Nonsecure FM radio communications between Headquarters, II FFORCEV and Headquarters, 9th Infantry Division was possible using a retransmission relay but FM secure voice can not be relayed by the use of existing equipment. Two AN/GRC-10 radio horizontally polarized directional antennas were turned to the FM secure voice frequency and were installed at Headquarters, II FFORCEV and Dong Tam. Current testing has proved a 90 percent communications reliability using secure voice made over a 60-mile non-line-of-sight circuit path. Usable FM communications can be achieved between two distant points if properly tuned directional antennas are used at both stations.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. None.

c. Training. District Intelligence and Operations Coordinating Center (DIOCC) Personnel.

(1) OBSERVATION. There is a need for training of Census Grievance and Revolutionary Development personnel assigned to DIOCC.

(2) EVALUATION. Vietnamese Directive 700/QDIII/TM/2/1, dated 1 June 1967, which directed the formation of DIOCC in III CTZ, specified that representatives of Census Grievance and Revolutionary Development teams in the district would be present in the DIOCC. Although some difficulties were encountered initially, these representatives are now present in most DIOCC in III CTZ. In some areas, these agencies, particularly Census Grievance, are providing useful information. In general, however, the considerable potential of these agencies is not being exploited in the attack on the enemy infrastructure. This lack of participation is due primarily to a lack of understanding on the part of the DIOCC representatives of their dual mission in the DIOCC: collection and collation of information. They have been provided little or no training in their specific functions in the DIOCC, and they are often removed from the DIOCC and reassigned after only a short period there.

(3) RECOMMENDATION. That these agencies, Census Grievance and Revolutionary Development, make available one capable individual to be trained

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(2) Transportation for Distributing Construction Materials.

(a) OBSERVATION. Provincial Social Welfare/Relief Services requires additional on-call transport for the distribution of construction materials.

(b) EVALUATION. Should large scale destruction of civilian housing take place as the result of combat operations or natural disaster, the Provincial Social Welfare/Relief Services will require additional transport to handle the distribution of construction materials to families rebuilding their houses. This organization incurred considerable difficulty in distributing relief materials following the recent offensives because of a lack of transportation.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That attention be given to providing an on call augmentation to the Provincial Social Welfare/Relief Services transportation capability to handle distribution of these supplies.

(3) Need for Improved Camouflage Jungle Fatigues.

(a) OBSERVATION. The present cotton camouflaged jungle fatigues are not durable enough for Long Range Patrol operations.

(b) EVALUATION. The 100 percent cotton camouflage jungle fatigue uniform used by Company F, (Long Range Patrol), 51st Infantry is made of material too thin to withstand the thick vegetation in which Long Range Patrols operate. Especially when wet, these uniforms rip easily, and they are too thin to afford protection against mosquitos.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That a jungle uniform be made with a thickness comparable to that of the Vietnamese jungle uniform, the so-called "Tiger" fatigue, for use in Long Range Patrol operations.

f. Organization.

(1) Need for Issue of CAR-15 Rifle.

(a) OBSERVATION. The M-16A1 rifle is too long and cumbersome for Long Range Patrol operations in thick jungle.

(b) EVALUATION. On many occasions when rapid fire is required, the length of the M-16A1 causes the rifle to snag on vines and underbrush, interfering with effective immediate firing. Long range patrol operations requires a compact, rapid firing, accurate weapon which can be carried at the ready position through the thickest vegetation, without becoming entangled. When quick reaction is required, a long rifle is not maneuverable; a man swinging to fire will often find his M-16A1 caught in the vegetation.

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by the PHOENIX/PHUNG HOANG training team, and then function as training officers, holding training sessions in each province for the district representatives of their respective agencies; that these individuals be temporarily attached to, and operate under the control of, the Region Intelligence and Operations Coordinating Center, and that provisions be made to prevent rapid turnover of DIOCC representatives through an improved assignment policy on the part of the respective agencies.

d. Intelligence. Consolidating PHOENIX and CORRAL Reports.

(1) OBSERVATION. Duplication exists in infrastructure reporting requirements at province level.

(2) EVALUATION. The S-2 Advisor at province level is required to submit the bi-monthly CORRAL report, which includes Viet Cong infrastructure killed, captured and rallied, while a similar monthly report is required of the Province PHOENIX Advisor. This duplication of effort is extremely time consuming.

(3) RECOMMENDATION. That these reports be consolidated into a single report submitted through PHOENIX channels.

e. Logistics.

(1) Air Movement.

(a) OBSERVATION. The 3d Brigade, 101st Air Cavalry Division, prepared and conducted an air movement involving nearly 200 sorties without a single significant delay being experienced at either the on-load or offload location.

(b) EVALUATION. The efficiency of this air movement from Phuoc Vinh to Dak To was the result of detailed and thorough prior planning and coordination. The unit with the assistance of its attached Tactical Air Liaison Officer planned all aircraft loads and established an order of movement priority. A planning conference was then held between the unit and the 834th Air Division with additional representation from Headquarters, II FFORCEV, Headquarters, 101st Air Cavalry Division, and the 2d Aerial Port Group. The detailed coordination effected during this conference subsequently allowed each element to make the necessary on-the-spot operational changes without disrupting the overall movement plan.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. It is recommended that detailed load planning be required of all units participating in air movements, and that a planning conference be conducted between the moving unit and the 834th Air Division for all unit moves of battalion size or larger.

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A long range patrol seldom engages targets beyond 25 meters and therefore does not require the range of the M-16 rifle. The key to long range patrol success is hip-fired, accurate, short-range, immediate firepower in all directions.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That Company F (Long Range Patrol), 51st Infantry be issued CAR-15 assault rifles as the TOE weapon.

(2) Addition of a VB Refugee Team to MTOE 41-500D, 2nd Civil Affairs Company.

(a) OBSERVATION. There has been a substantial increase in the number of refugees in the III CTZ since the TET and May VC/NVA offensives. It must be anticipated that future combat operations could result in the creation of increasing numbers of refugees.

(b) EVALUATION. The handling of refugees during the initial stages of processing is extremely important, not only to prevent interference with combat operations, but to provide the refugees with concrete evidence that the GVN is interested in their welfare. This aids in convincing the refugee that it is advantageous to support the GVN. Although there are sufficient GVN programs to support and handle refugee problems, there is usually a time lag between the arrival of refugees and the arrival of funds, food and material to support them. This was the case the first weeks after the TET and May Offensive. However, through the resourcefulness and immediate reaction of US units, initial problems were overcome and upon arrival of funds through GVN channels operational control was given to GVN. The availability of a skilled and trained refugee team to cope with such future contingencies is highly desirable to provide a ready reaction capability to US units within III CTZ.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That MTOE 41-500D, 2nd Civil Affairs Company be modified to provide for one VB Refugee Team.

(3) Administrative Warrant Officer in the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate.

(a) OBSERVATION. The bulk of the administrative load of the Headquarters, II FFORCEV Staff Judge Advocate Section can and should be carried by the Sergeant Major (E9), MOS 71D50.

(b) EVALUATION. A legal administrative warrant officer, who happened to be an attorney, was assigned to the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, Headquarters, II FFORCEV at a time of extreme shortage of legal personnel. As a result, the warrant officer was used as a legal assistance officer and spent less than 20 percent of his time supervising office administration.

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This has proved satisfactory, has provided fuller utilization of the time and talents of a senior non-commissioned officer, and has enabled the office to continue its legal assistance program. The Staff Judge Advocate instituted action to have the MTOE further modified to delete the warrant officer space, MOS 713A, and to add one space for a captain, JAGC, MOS 8103.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That this change be approved promptly to allow sufficient lead time to requisition a JAGC officer prior to the rotation of the present administrative warrant officer.

## (4) Use of Non-JAGC Lawyers by DEPCORDS.

(a) OBSERVATION. The assignment of two non-JAGC lawyers with civil affairs training to DEPCORDS, III CTZ, has provided an in-house legal capability immediately responsive to his requirements.

(b) EVALUATION. In the past, DEPCORDS has obtained legal assistance from the Staff Judge Advocate, Headquarters, II FFORCEV. From the standpoint of Headquarters, II FFORCEV, the utilization by DEPCORDS of non-JAGC lawyers has proved satisfactory and should remain so as long as those lawyers continue to obtain legal policy guidance from the Staff Judge Advocate, Headquarters, II FFORCEV.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That at least one civil affairs trained legal officer, MOS 8101, be assigned at all times to the Staff of DEPCORDS, III CTZ, and that his activities be coordinated with the overall legal policy guidance of the Staff Judge Advocate, II FFORCEV.

## g. Other.

### (1) Address Indicating Groups.

(a) OBSERVATION. Message handling within the communications centers has been greatly facilitated by the implementation of many new Address Indicating Groups (AIG) for reports which are of a recurring nature. Message preparation time and raw circuit time has been greatly reduced by the substitution of a single AIG for several pages of action and/or information addresses.

(b) EVALUATION. With the teletype message communications system traffic volume near the saturation point, Address Indicating Groups are playing a vital role in reducing message preparation time and in saving valuable transmission time. With the promulgation of AIG for use by OPCON units of II FFORCEV, the savings in message preparation and handling times were effectively passed on to the OPCON units of II FFORCEV.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. The program to provide OPCON units of II FFORCEV

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with Address Indicating Groups must be carried on and expanded. Use of  
AIG by message originators must be stressed and Message Review Boards should  
back this program to the fullest extent.

**(2) Intensified Military Civic Action through Greater Participation  
by US Units.**

(a) OBSERVATION. Vietnamese civilians with a friendly attitude have  
been of considerable assistance in furnishing intelligence on enemy faci-  
lities and activities in and around their respective hamlets.

(b) EVALUATION. Military civic action programs have had a noted  
influence on the attitude and cooperation of the Vietnamese people in  
their relationship with the GVN, US and ARVN military personnel. In  
areas where US participation in civic action projects was emphasized,  
improvements in the attitudes and cooperation of the Vietnamese people  
were revealed through the increased enthusiasm of the people to initiate  
their own projects. In addition, they did most of the work on these  
projects and volunteered information on VC activity in their areas. This  
positive trend justifies a program of renewed emphasis on military civic  
action programs in all areas of III CTZ where US units are stationed.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That military commanders coordinate with their  
respective Province Senior Advisors and give increased emphasis to mili-  
tary civic action programs within their TAOR/TAOI as a primary means of  
obtaining the vital civilian support necessary for the successful accomplish-  
ment of GVN/US objectives in Vietnam.

**(3) Outer Belt Hamlet (OBH).**

(a) OBSERVATION. At the present time American sanction has still  
not been given at the Saigon level for the Outer Belt Hamlet Plan for  
which directives have been published by the Vietnamese since April 1968.

(b) EVALUATION. Difficulties in planning and supervising all Revo-  
lutionary Development programs are encountered at subordinate levels as a  
result of this late reaction to Vietnamese planning.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That appropriate steps be taken to expedite  
US/GVN agreement at the national level as to whether the program is to  
be fully implemented or discontinued and that appropriate instructions  
be issued.

**(4) Security for Chieu Hoi Hamlets.**

(a) OBSERVATION. Additional security is required for the Chieu

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Hoi centers and hamlets to assist in defense against enemy attacks.

(b) EVALUATION. The enemy has stated in its propaganda that it intends to raid and kill occupants of Chieu Hoi centers and hamlets. The Combined Campaign Plan calls for additional protection to these installations, but adequate measures have not been taken.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That additional protection be provided for Chieu Hoi hamlets and centers.

(5) Joint Resource Control Operations at Checkpoints.

(a) OBSERVATION. US/FWMAF forces should not operate resource control checkpoints without the presence of a Vietnamese National Policeman (NP) to assist them.

(b) EVALUATION. Every effort should be made by military personnel to stimulate the NP to search and deal with the Vietnamese people stopped at checkpoints. Experience has shown that when the US/FWMAF aggressively take the lead in checkpoint operations the NP will and let the military do the work. This creates an undesirable situation and does not help to improve the US/FWMAF image in Vietnam. The NP must assume the initiative. US/FWMAF working with the police must attempt to instill in them the confidence necessary to take the lead in accomplishing the stated mission.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That National Police be present during Joint Resource Control operations at checkpoints and that they deal with Vietnamese nationals.

(6) AN/MSQ 85 Audio Visual Unit.

(a) OBSERVATION. When mounted in a standard three-quarter ton truck, the AN/MSQ 85 can be utilized to its maximum capacity. The AN/MSQ 85 Audio Visual unit can provide tape reproduction, a 16mm motion/sound picture projector, a 35mm slide and film strip projector, and a trans-oceanic radio reception and loudspeaker system for face-to-face communication with any given target audience.

(b) EVALUATION. The AN/MSQ 85 Audio Visual Unit has been in operation with II FFORCEV psychological warfare units for approximately one week. Even during this short period, the unit proved to have many distinct advantages over the Civil Affairs Audio Visual Aid mobile unit, such as improved cross-country mobility, better utilization of standard equipment and a more effective operation. When removed from its vehicle, the AN/MSQ 85 is air transportable and may be operated from a static position. When mounted in the three-quarter ton truck this unit can be more easily serviced.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. None.

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AVFEC-RE-H

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam  
for Period Ending 31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR - 65 (RI) (W-DHO-  
TO-A) (U)

(7) The Use of Fibro-Cement in Construction.

(a) OBSERVATION. Experience has shown that aluminum roofing is unsuitable for the construction of maintenance shops and similar facilities.

(b) EVALUATION. The type of aluminum roofing now being used for the construction of province maintenance shops, because of its lack of strength, has proved unsuitable. Project managers in both Phuoc Tuy and Binh Tuy Provinces requested replacement of the light-weight aluminum material by a heavier gauge aluminum even before the construction projects were completed. It has been determined that even this heavier gauge product will require replacement with a few years. Another product, fibro-cement, which has superior qualities, is manufactured locally and is readily available. It is more expensive than aluminum roofing, but should last much longer. Its use also would assist local industry.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That consideration be given to the use of fibro-cement in the construction of maintenance shops and other similar facilities.

(8) Reconstruction Assistance for Victims of the May Offensive.

(a) OBSERVATION. The GVN has declined to extend eligibility for reconstruction assistance to victims of the May offensive who live outside the Saigon/Gia Dinh area.

(b) EVALUATION. This action is detrimental to the psychological operations effort outside the Saigon/Gia Dinh area. By extending this assistance the GVN would demonstrate its concern for these people and as a result gain considerable public favor.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That the GVN be urged to provide reconstruction assistance to victims of the May offensive who live outside the area now being assisted.

(9) Planning and Coordination in Resettlement Operations.

(a) OBSERVATION. Ample planning and detailed coordination among tactical elements, province advisory teams, DEPCORDS, III CTZ, and local Corps and GVN authorities, has resulted in an outstanding operation which will permit the rapid resettlement of the relocated population with a minimum of hardship.

(b) EVALUATION. The success of this corps-level program is in marked contrast to a similar effort carried out in Binh Long Province in April. In this operation, a lack of advance coordination resulted in the granting of little GVN assistance to some 500 of the families involved. Resettlement conditions four months after the movement are still poor despite the fact

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AVFBC-RE-III

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam  
for Period Ending 31 July 1968, RGS CSFOR - 65 (RI) (W-DHO-  
TO-A) (U)

that the movement itself was well executed by the US military elements involved.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That elements involved in such operations conduct detailed planning and coordination before beginning such operations.

### (10) Excessive Bureaucratic Controls.

(a) OBSERVATION. Many problems encountered in economic development, particularly in industrial development, can be traced directly to excessive bureaucratic controls and the extensive involvement of the Vietnamese Government in activities which are properly a function of private enterprise.

(b) EVALUATION. Example of this problem can be found in the operation by the Government of a considerable proportion of the nation's industrial plant, and in the distribution of fertilizers and insecticides in connection with the IR-8 program. Much of the burden of economic development must, of necessity, be borne by the private sector if this development is to take place efficiently. There is a great need to create a climate conducive to private capital investment and for measures to encourage an increased involvement of the private sector in the country's economic growth.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That measures be taken to increase the role of private enterprise in this field.

### (11) Reorganization of Regional Administration.

(a) OBSERVATION. The effective dissolution in May of the offices of Government Delegate and Deputy Government Delegate indicate a need for close relationships between top-level US advisory officials and their counterparts with the GVN. A need also exists for clarification of the command and control structure which resulted from this reorganization.

(b) EVALUATION. The reorganization of the leadership structure, under which the Commanding General, III Corps served as Government Delegate, represented a major shift from control at the regional level to direct control from the level of central Government. The US advisory effort at central Government level did not forestall the making of this move, which now appears to have been unwise and ill-timed. It is not known whether US advisors were consulted prior to the reorganization. If they were, it is not known whether they recognized the probable consequences, which have resulted in a weakening of command and administrative effectiveness in all provinces. Following as it did in the wake of the IZ Offensive, this move to change basic command and coordination relationships came at a time when the greatest degree of stability and clearly defined leadership was required. It is highly desirable that the US mission be in close contact with those GVN officials who are in positions to initiate basic changes in Governmental structure and relationships. US officials charged with this responsibility

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam  
for Period Ending 31 July 1968, LCS CSFOR - 65 (R1) (W-DHO-  
TO-A) (U)

should be alert to the implications and probable result of such moves. They should have extensive knowledge concerning the operations of complex civil and military establishments and of the principles of sound administrative organization. Through the establishment of close and effective working relationships with key GVN officials, it should be possible to modify or redirect moves which might otherwise prove damaging to the common effort.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS. In view of the foregoing, it is recommended that increased attention be given to the development of close advisory relationships with GVN officials in critical decision-making positions. It is further recommended that immediate attention be given to clarifying the status of the entire regional administrative organization; determining who, if anyone, will carry out the command and coordination functions previously exercised by the Government Delegate, and clarifying the relationship of the Province Chief to the central Government and to the region, including designation of a single point of command for the Province Chief.

(12) Increased Incorporation of Vietnamese Women into the National Labor Force.

(a) OBSERVATION. There is a need to incorporate women in the Vietnamese labor force to compensate for the shortage of available manpower.

(b) EVALUATION. The increased number of men being drafted into Vietnamese military forces has resulted in an acute labor shortage. In several CORDS programs efforts are being made to recruit women to fill jobs formerly held by men. Such an effort is both acceptable to Vietnamese society and potentially extremely successful. This is illustrated by the success of the Vietnamese training program currently conducted by Headquarters, USARV. Women represent 70 - 80 percent of trainees in such subjects as driving and motor mechanics, and are well represented in classes dealing with typewriter and electronics repair.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That a systematic effort be undertaken to assist South Vietnam in making use of its female labor force.

(13) The Role of the District Senior Advisor in the PHOENIX Program.

(a) OBSERVATION. The District Senior Advisor should play an active role in the PHOENIX program.

(b) EVALUATION. The PHOENIX Program at its inception provided for the District Senior Advisor to be the individual at least nominally responsible for the PHOENIX Program in the district, with a DIOCC Advisor to assist him. As the program developed, however, channels of communication were established directly with the DIOCC Advisor, requirements were levied

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam  
for Period Ending 31 July 1968, RGS CSFOR - 65 (R1) (W-DHO-  
TO-A) (U)

directly upon him, and PHOENIX training and guidance were provided almost exclusively to the DIOCC Advisor. As a result, the District Senior Advisor has not been informed about or involved in the program, and has not been sufficiently knowledgeable to influence the District Chief concerning the PHOENIX/PHUNG HOANG Program. The District Senior Advisor is now required to attend a monthly meeting at province level in which the objectives and problems of the program will be discussed, communications have been established with the District Senior Advisor, and the Deputy Senior Advisor is now being rated partly on the basis of his ability to implement the concepts of the PHOENIX/PHUNG HOANG Program.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. None.

*Walter T. Kerwin Jr.*

8-Incl

~~cc~~ Incl 1, 2, 6 and 7  
Withdrawn, HQ, DA

WALTER T. KERWIN JR.  
Major General, USA  
Acting Commander

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9-25

AVHGC-DST (14 Aug 68) 1st Ind (C) MAJ Klingman/ds/LBN 4433  
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam  
for Period Ending 31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR - 65 (R1) (W-DHO-  
TO-A) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY VIETNAM, AFO San Francisco 96375 14 SEP 1968

TO: ✓Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOF-DT,  
AFO 96558

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons  
Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1968, from Headquarters,  
II Field Force Vietnam.

2. (C) Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning DIOCC personnel, page 66, paragraph 2c:  
Concur. The DIOCC is the most important manifestation of the PHOENIX  
program and can function effectively only with representatives available  
from all collection means within the district. A rapid turnover and lack  
of understanding of the DIOCC unnecessarily inhibit its functions. Since  
the Census Grievance and Revolutionary Development agencies are cadred or  
advised by MACCORDS, and are not within this headquarter's area of  
influence. This headquarters will forward the ORLL to MACV.

b. Reference item concerning consolidating PHOENIX and CORRAL Reports,  
page 67, paragraph 2d: Concur. Although the reports are currently  
submitted through different channels, arrangements can be made to provide  
the information on a need to know basis from the PHOENIX report. The  
CORRAL reports are submitted through MACV J2 channels and the PHOENIX  
reports through MACCORDS channels. Combining the reports would eliminate  
duplication of effort at the province level. This headquarters will forward  
the ORLL to MACV.

c. Reference item concerning transportation for distributing con-  
struction materials, page 68, paragraph 2e(2): Nonconcur. Procedures  
have been established by CORDS and MACV J4 to move CORDS sponsored cargo  
on an emergency basis. In III CTZ, TMA can be contacted for modes other  
than truck transportation, and the DOT, Saigon Support Command, through  
CORDS/MSD/LOG, can be contacted for truck transportation. Mr. Fred  
Marshall, Senior Logistics Advisor, Region III has been informed of the  
proper procedures.

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AVHGC-DST (14 Aug 68) 1st Ind (C)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam  
for Period Ending 31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR - 65 (R1) (W-DHO-  
TO-A) (U)

d. Reference item concerning need for improved camouflage jungle fatigues, page 68, paragraph 2e(2): Concur. Recommend that the using unit submit an Equipment Improvement Recommendation (EIR) in accordance with paragraph 3-7.4 of TM 38-750 stating fully the deficiencies noted.

e. Reference item concerning need for issue of CAR-15 rifle, page 68, paragraph 2f(1). The small arms CBOI published by the USA Combat Developments Command, dated 12 February 1968, provides a basis for authorizing the CAR-15 submachine gun to those individuals whose normal proximity to the enemy imposes a requirement for immediate access to their weapons and whose execution of their primary duty would be impeded by the additional length or weight of the rifle. Accordingly, CAR-15 SMG may be issued to the Long Range Patrol Company in lieu of the M16A1 rifle. MTOE action should be taken by Company F (Long Range Patrol), 51st Infantry IAW USARV Circular 310-44, dated 31 May 1968.

f. Reference item concerning addition of a VB Refugee Team to MTOE 41-500D, 2d Civil Affairs Company, page 69, reference 2f(2). On 22 March 1968, changes to MTOE 41-500D, under which the 2d Civil Affairs Company is organized, were submitted to DA. These changes realign the company into generalist teams as opposed to the current functional teams. The generalist teams will be area oriented and will provide tactical commanders optimum planning and operational assistance in refugee care and control. Therefore, the proposed MTOE will satisfy the stated requirement. Coordination with COMUS indicated that further comments will be provided by that office.

g. Reference item concerning administrative warrant officer in the office of the SJA, page 69, paragraph 2f(3). At this time, no MTOE has been received deleting the warrant officer space MOS 713A and adding one space for a captain, JAGC, MOS 2103. Upon receipt of mentioned MTOE, the indicated requirement will be evaluated; if considered valid and submitted IAW USARV Circular 310-44, dated 31 May 1968, the requirement will be processed for approval by higher headquarters.

h. Reference item concerning VB Refugee Team, page 69, paragraph f(2): Nonconcur. The 2d Civil Affairs Company has reorganized into 19 generalists teams of 7 men each pending the DA approval of a new MTOE. This reorganization was the result of a study approved by COMUSMACV. Since all generalist teams are mobile and have the capability of refugee control,

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AVHGC-DST (14 Aug 68) 1st LHM 10,  
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam  
for Period Ending 31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR - 65 (R1) (W-DHO-  
TO-A

judicious redeployment of any team within the CTZ or from outside the CTZ can now be made to handle the initial stages of refugee control.

i. Reference item concerning intensified military civic action, paragraph g(2): Concur. USARV Regulation No 515-1, 20 May 1968, requires all units to pursue a vigorous military civic action program and to coordinate it through the province senior advisor.

j. Reference reconstruction assistance for victims of the May Offensive, paragraph 2g(8), page 73: Concur. This headquarters will recommend to MACV that MACCORDS Refugee Division continue to seek GVN assistance for these victims at the highest levels of government.

k. Reference item concerning the increased incorporation of Vietnamese women into the national labor force, paragraph 2g(12), page 75: Nonconcur. The main problem concerns the entire labor force in South Vietnam to include veterans, Hoi Chanh, and the elderly, as well as women. USAID is already attempting to assist the GVN in establishing better manpower utilization policies. The exclusive emphasis on female labor could be harmful to the overall program.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

*W. C. Arntz*  
W. C. ARNTZ  
ILT, AGC  
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:  
HQ II FFV

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GPOP-DT (14 Aug 68) 2d Ind (C)  
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, II Field Force  
Vietnam for Period Ending 31 July 1968,  
RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 21 OCT 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development,  
Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsement and concurs in the report as indorsed except as noted in paragraph 2 below.
2. (C) Reference (page 19) paragraph 1c(5): The PW figure reported, 325, is at variance with the figure reported in the Twenty-fifth MACV Monthly PW Report which covers the same period. The MACV report for July shows only 283 PW's country wide. MACV's report is the accepted source of PW statistics. Many of the personnel reported as PW's probably are not PW's in fact, but are detained personnel awaiting classification. This headquarters will recommend to CG USARV that VN/NVA battle loss statistics in the future differentiate between confirmed PW and unclassified detainees.
3. (U) Reference 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2h: The handling of refugees during the initial stages of processing is an important function; however, it is a function of the GVN. The 2d CA Co could better assist the GVN in preparing CA plans for the control, housing, and other logistical support required. An example of how planning could be done is the designation of certain buildings such as schools, abandoned plantations, and military barracks for the emergency housing of refugees. Additionally, food supplies and other health and comfort items could be stored in a central location within each province to provide some degree of emergency assistance to refugees when they are generated. It is felt that through judicious

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GPOP-DT (14 Aug 68) 2d Ind (C)  
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, II Field Force  
Vietnam for Period Ending 31 July 1968,  
RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

planning, the GVN should be capable of handling the  
refugee problem better than one refugee team consisting  
of two officers and four EM.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

*C. L. Gromit*

C. L. GROMIT  
CPT, AGC  
Asst AG

Copy furnished:  
CGUSARV

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STATISTICAL SUMMARY  
USAF C130/C123 SORTIES  
1 MAY 68 - 31 JULY 68

UNIT	PRI 1	CE	ER	TAGE	TOTAL
1st Div	187	107			294
9th Div	40	6			46
25th Div	130	111			241
101st Air Cav	399	119			518
5th SFG (abn)	253	41			294
II AFRCOLV Arty	210	20			230
12th Avn Gp	21				21
53d Sig	--	--			--
79th LngR	66	--			66
CAUS	4	--			4
11th AGR	--	--			--
303 RR Bn	--	--			--
361st Avn Co	34	--			34
272d ASH Co	40	--			40
145th Avn Co	3	--			3
TOTALS	1,387	404			1,791

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STATISTICAL SUMMARY  
CLOSE AIR SUPPORT (U)  
1 May 68 - 31 July 68

	<u>SUBTOTAL</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
1. (C) FAC-controlled Air Sorties.		
FWMAF	10515	
VMAF	5332	15847
2. (C) FAC-controlled Sorties in Support of RVMAF.		
By FWMAF	2283	
By VMAF	3049	5332
3. (C) FAC-controlled Sorties in Support of FWMAF.		
FWMAF	10460	
VMAF	55	10515
4. (C) Distribution of Sorties (FAC-controlled) in Support of:		
RVMAF	5334	
1st Div	2589	
9th Div	2546	
25th Div	3157	
CMAF	104	
101st Air Cav Div	709	
199th Bde	288	
11th ACR	299	
1st ATF	709	
HQ II PFORCEV	4	
Co A, 5th SFG	108	
5. (C) Radar Controlled (Combat Sky Spot) Missions in Support of:		
RVMAF	146	
1st Div	96	
9th Div	60	
25th Div	140	
CMAF	0	
101st Air Cav Div	63	
199th Bde	36	
11th ACR	5	
1st ATF	60	
HQ II PFORCEV	217	
Co A, 5th SFG	1	624

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6. (C) Results.

KBA (BC)	1089
KBA (EST)	1285
Structures (Destroyed)	2251
Structures (Damaged)	1786
Sampans (Destroyed)	224
Sampans (Damaged)	79

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## ARMY AVIATION STATISTICS

1 MAY - 31 JULY 68

<u>ROTARY WING</u>	<u>MAY</u>	<u>JUNE</u>	<u>JULY</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Sorties	152,764	139,938	124,969	417,671
Hours	52,180	49,814	53,336	155,330
Troops Lifted	233,802	244,331	350,045	828,178
Tons of Cargo	28,199	26,735	40,221	95,155

<u>FIXED WING</u>				
Sorties	10,134	9,008	9,323	28,465
Hours	9,708	9,516	9,132	28,356
Troops Lifted	7,608	8,023	9,470	25,101
Tons of Cargo	137	158	224	519

<u>PERSONNEL</u>				
Crewmembers WIA	80	22	21	123
Crewmembers KIA	18	20	5	43
VC KBA (Conf)	1,636	515	275	2,426

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## II FIELD FORCE, VIETNAM TROOP LIST

1 May 68 - 31 Jul 68

### OPCON UNITS

UNIT	DATE	LOCATION
1st Inf Div	15 Mar 66	LAI KHE
9th Inf Div	14 Dec 66	BEARCAT
25th Inf Div	22 Mar 66	CU CHI
199th Inf Bde (SEP) (LT)	10 Dec 66	LONG BINH
1st ATF	Jun 66	NUI DAT
3d Bde, 101st Air Cav Div	20 Dec 67	PHUOC VINH
RTAVR	22 Sep 67	BEARCAT
RTAVF	22 Jul 68	BEARCAT
23d Arty Gp	15 Mar 66	PHU LAI
54th Arty Gp	1 Oct 66	XUAN LOC
12th Avn Gp	15 Mar 66	LONG BINH
168th Engr Bn (CBT)	4 Jun 67	DI AN
582nd Engr Bn (CBT)	4 Jun 67	TAY NINH
100th Engr Co (LE)	4 Jun 67	LONG BINH
362d Engr Co (FB)	4 Jun 67	TAY NINH
500th Engr Co (FB)	4 Jun 67	LONG BINH
6th PSYOP Bn	6 Dec 66	BIFN BOA

### TENANT UNIT

61st Med Det	25 Jun 66	LONG BINH
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### ASSIGNED UNITS

HHC, II FFORCEV	10 Jan 66	LONG BINH
HNB, II FFORCEV Arty	17 Jan 66	LONG BINH
HNB, 8th TAB, 25th Arty	13 Aug 66	LONG BINH
2d CA Co	7 Dec 66	LONG BINH
7th Mil Hist Det	1 Jun 66	LONG BINH
9th Trans Co (CAR)	23 Aug 66	LONG BINH
16 PI Det	4 Jun 66	LONG BINH
16th Sig Det	16 May 66	LONG BINH
29th Chem Det	10 Mar 66	LONG BINH
44th APU	1 Oct 66	LONG BINH
53d Sig Bn (CORPS)	4 Jun 66	LONG BINH
219th MI Det	20 May 66	LONG BINH
517th Engr Det	4 Jun 66	LONG BINH
552d MP Co	25 Sep 66	LONG BINH
Co F, (LRF), 51st Inf	25 Sep 67	LONG BINH

### ATTACHED UNITS

*11th ACR	20 Jun 68	LONG GIAO
5th Bn, 2d Arty (AMSP)	27 Nov 66	LONG BINH
D Btry, 71st Arty (AM)	27 Nov 66	LONG BINH
Det 32, Weather Sqdn	1 Oct 66	LONG BINH
303d RR Bn	8 Jun 66	LONG BINH

\*Changed from OPCON to ATTACHED

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The following items are recommended for inclusion in the Lessons Learned Index:

ITEM 1

\* SUBJECT TITLE \_\_\_\_\_  
 \*\* FOR OT RD # \_\_\_\_\_  
 \*\*\*PAGE # \_\_\_\_\_

ITEM 2

SUBJECT TITLE \_\_\_\_\_  
 FOR OT RD # \_\_\_\_\_  
 PAGE # \_\_\_\_\_

ITEM 3

SUBJECT TITLE \_\_\_\_\_  
 FOR OT RD # \_\_\_\_\_  
 PAGE # \_\_\_\_\_

ITEM 4

SUBJECT TITLE \_\_\_\_\_  
 FOR OT RD # \_\_\_\_\_  
 PAGE # \_\_\_\_\_

ITEM 5

SUBJECT TITLE \_\_\_\_\_  
 FOR OT RD # \_\_\_\_\_  
 PAGE # \_\_\_\_\_

\* Subject Title: A short (one sentence or phrase) description of the item of interest.

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